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 In this issue, we extend our approach to 
Space & Defense as a challenge within the broad 
field of inquiry known as political economy.  By 
this we mean that national defense of “spaces” or 
multiple domains for national security involves 
more than allocating resources and executing 
programs for increasing military capability. It also 
entails thinking through strategic problem sets that 
include elements of cooperation—international 
alliances and domestic negotiations—as well as 
competition among military organizations. 
 
Consistent with our aim to open the journal’s 
editorial scope and address all relevant frontiers of 
defense policy, this issue welcomes contributions 
on space, cyber security, artificial intelligence and 
nuclear deterrence.  General John E. Hyten, then-
commander of U.S. Strategic Command, 
addressed cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy 
(USAFA) for the 2019 Eaker Lecture on 
preparing to meet the 21st century deterrence 
mission.  He has graciously allowed Space & 
Defense to publish a lightly edited transcript of his 
remarks to future Air and Space Force officers.   
 
In our first feature article, Roger Wortman of the 
U.S. Space Force reflects on the mission of 
defending vulnerable satellites on orbit.  He draws 
inspiration from a popular fictional tale, Defence 
of Duffer’s Drift, to explain how military science 
may be supplemented by game play that entertains 
a type of dream world based on reality but flexible 
with respect to counterfactuals for adversary plans 
of attack.  Implications for developing USSF 
strategy, operational art, doctrine, and adaptability 
in crises ought to hold, regardless of whether or 
when international powers choose to weaponize 
space. 
 
Abderrahmane Sokri extends the theme of 
imperfect defense to the cyber domain.  He uses a 
clever application of the business-based leader-
follower equilibrium from economic theory to 
explore the possibility of a Goldilocks solution for 
cyber defense.  As in the classic Stackelberg 
competition, first mover’s optimal strategy is not 
to invest everything he has, for there will be 
diminishing rate of return on how much he deters 
his adversary.  With relatively few, plausible 
assumptions on how investment improves 
resilience of cyber networks for defender, and 
limits benefits for attacker, Sokri conjures a game-
theoretic world that offers insights as to how 
defender can calibrate just-right spending on 
cyber defense and (unlike cyber offense) advertise 
his effort with intent to lock an adversary into 
predictable equilibrium play.   
 
In this issue, we present two remarkable cadet 
papers nurtured by USAFA’s Nuclear Weapons 
and Strategy minor and recognized by external 
experts on deterrence.  Second Lieutenant 
Marshall Foster (USAFA ’20) reviews the 
burgeoning literature on how artificial intelligence 
will affect strategic stability and supplies his own 
account based on the interaction of strategic 
cultures.  Second Lieutenant Liam Connolly 
(USAFA ’19) surveys recent pressure on Baltic 
states within NATO and raises the importance of 
national resilience—a rather complex correlate of 
defense spending—for the success of U.S. 
extended deterrence in Europe.   
 
Finally, as contributing editor, I review The Death 
of Expertise (Oxford, 2017) by Naval War 
College professor Tom Nichols.  Nichols in the 
book is mainly concerned about how status 
decline of experts in American society imperils 
modern democracy, which depends on elected 
representatives as generalists, weighing 
competing advice from professionals or accepting 
political risk in order to follow the truth presented 
by expert consensus.  Many of Nichols’ examples 
land in the policy areas of health, education, and 
economy, but as an international security scholar, 
he is aware of additional implications from the 
death of expertise for foreign policy and U.S. 
strategic competence.  Nichols’ challenges, I 
argue, are important for civilian analysts and 
military officers, the relevant experts, to keep at 
the forefront as they prepare the new Space Force, 
against rapidly evolving threats, under democratic 
civilian control and subordinate to the authority of 
elected politicians.   
In my case, as is true for all our authors, 
contributions herein are academic and do not 
represent official policy or opinion of the U.S. Air 
Force or the U.S. Space Force. 
 
 







     
       
    
 
  
Senior Leader Voice 
 
As Delivered Remarks 
 
Gen John E. Hyten 
On 23 April 2019, Gen Hyten, commander of USSTRATCOM, visited the Air Force Academy to give the 
annual Ira C. Eaker lecture on National Defense Policy.  Before soon to be graduates and officers, Gen 
Hyten discussed how several Air Force career fields, particularly those involving missiles and space, 
contribute to successful deterrence in the 21st century.  -Editor 
 
 
Location: U.S. Air Force Academy, 
Colorado Springs, Colorado  
Event: Eaker Lecture on National 
Defense Policy (Edited Transcript for 
Clarity)    
 
…I always thought, many times as I look 
back, if life would have been different if I’d 
gone to the Air Force Academy because one 
of the big advantages you guys are about to 
experience as you go into the world, into the 
United States Air Force, is that you will have 
a support structure built in from the day you 
come into the service. You will have this 
group of people that you had a common 
experience with for your four years. As you 
go through that structure you will have that 
common bond that will pull you together. It’s 
an amazing thing. I didn’t have that. 
 
I was the first class back into Harvard after 
the Vietnam riots. We had nine students that 
were in ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps] that cross-enrolled in MIT 
[Massachusetts Institute of Technology] when 
I first started. A month into the program there 
were only five because we got kicked, cursed, 
spat at, assaulted, all on the streets of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, just because we 
were wearing the uniform of our nation’s 
country. Four of my classmates decided 
they’d figure out some other way to pay, but I 
couldn’t afford Harvard unless the Air Force 
paid for it. So we stayed, the five of us stayed. 
Now, the other four are gone as well, and 
none served 20 years. So, I don’t have any 
classmates still serving. You guys will have 
classmates all the way through that you get to 
deal with. 
 
…And it’s a special place that you’re about to 
join. Whether you’re ’22, ’21, 2019, wherever 
you are, you’re about to join the United States 
Air Force and I hope you enjoyed some of the 
pictures that were in that video you just 
looked through. Pictures of the most powerful 
combatant command in the world, my 
command, U.S. Strategic Command. It is 
simply the most powerful command that’s 
ever been created. Some of my friends don’t 
like it when I say that, but it’s simply the fact. 
It’s true. That’s who we are. 
 
But, I want you to think back just a short 
period of time in our history when just over a 
decade ago that command with all the 
capability you just saw was dying on a vine. It 
had huge problems. It had morale problems 
across the entire force. It got to be so bad, we 
loaded a nuclear weapon on a B-52 and flew 
it from North Dakota to Louisiana, and until it 
got to Louisiana nobody even knew we did it. 
We sent missile parts from Hill Air Force 
Base in Utah to Taiwan, and didn’t even 
know we did it – nuclear missile parts. We 
had huge cheating scandals in the nuclear 
force on the Navy side as well as the Air 
Force side.  
 
How could that happen? How could the most 
powerful command in the United States end 
up with those kinds of problems? It did 
because we took our eye off of what the most 
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important thing in our country is, and the 
most important thing in our country is our 
nation’s security. Our nation’s security is 
guaranteed by the capabilities of U.S. 
Strategic Command. 
 
We had senior leadership at a northern-tier 
missile base who stood up in front of a bunch 
of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] 
operators, a bunch of missileers, a bunch of 
the finest people that the nation’s ever 
produced, and said you guys need to get out 
of the missile business and get into the space 
business because the missile business is dying 
and the space business is where it’s going to 
be happening. That’s not a great way to deal 
with the most important mission in the United 
States Air Force, to tell the people that 
actually do it that they’re a dying mission. 
 
It’s not a dying mission. It’s the most 
important mission that we have. Nuclear 
deterrence is what this nation’s defense is 
based on. From beginning to end, that’s where 
it starts. And if you don’t understand that, you 
don’t understand the concept of military 
power; you don’t understand the concept of 
deterrence. Nuclear capabilities are essential 
to our nation’s security. And a lot of people 
still question that. But you’re about to enter 
an Air Force where that nuclear business is 
critical to everything that we do, and you need 
to understand what that is. 
 
One of the questions that I get more often 
than any other question is can you, me, 
imagine a world without nuclear weapons? 
And the answer is yes. I can imagine a world 
without nuclear weapons and everybody in 
this room can imagine a world without 
nuclear weapons as well. Because you know 
what that world looks like? The world before 
August of 1945. Somewhere in high school 
history or here at the academy you’ve studied 
a little bit about World War II. So let’s just 
think about the numbers of World War II for a 
second. 
 
Between the years 1939 and 1945 the world 
killed somewhere between 60 and 80 million 
people in World War II. Think about those 
numbers. Sixty to 80 million people killed in 
a war. 
 
If you do the math, that’s about 33,000 people 
a day being killed in World War II. If you 
think about this nation’s horrible experience 
in Vietnam, and all the heroes that we sent, 
our nation’s greatest treasure, our sons and 
daughters into Vietnam to fight for our 
freedoms, in that horrible experience we lost 
58,000 Americans – 58,000 of our sons and 
daughters. That’s two days of violence in 
World War II. Two days. Imagine every day 
that goes by and it’s the entire destruction of 
the Vietnam War. Ever since nuclear weapons 
were invented that level of destruction went 
away. It went away because the nations that 
had those nuclear capabilities always had to 
be worried about whether they were going to 
cross the line that would cause their adversary 
to want to use nuclear weapons back against 
them. That’s the basis of deterrence. 
 
The basis of deterrence is having a capability 
that is so fearful that the adversary won’t 
cross that line and won’t ever walk down that 
path. That’s what we want to have happen. 
But in order for deterrence to work, we have 
to be ready to fight that nuclear war each and 
every day and that’s the pictures you saw on 
the screen. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, 
Marines of U.S. Strategic Command 
practicing that mission every day so that our 
adversaries see it and they know it and they 
won’t walk down that line. That’s what 
nuclear weapons mean in the world of the 
21st century. 
 
But we took our eye off it because 9/11 
happened. And most of the people in this 
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room have no memories of the world before 
9/11/2001 because you are not old enough. 
And because you don’t have those memories 
your entire experience has been focused on 
the Global War on Terror. And as we walk 
into the future, that global war on terror is not 
going to go away. We’ve had great success on 
the battlefield in Syria. Great success on the 
battlefields of Iraq. Afghanistan is reaching a 
place where we’re talking peace with the 
Taliban. All those things are looking good, 
but I tell you what, terrorism is not going 
away. Terrorism is at least a generational 
thing. Terrorism is something that you’re 
going to have to deal with your entire time in 
the military whether it’s a four-year plan like 
I had or a 42-year plan like I ended up. 
Whatever that plan is, you’re going to be 
dealing with terrorism that entire time. 
 
But here’s an interesting thing about the 
terrorists that want to attack the United States. 
They will never be able to defeat the United 
States of America. Ever. We have to protect 
our citizens, we have to protect our 
capabilities, and they want to terrorize us, 
they want to damage us. They’re going to do 
those things and we’re going to fight and 
defeat them wherever they happen to be. But 
they are not an existential threat to this 
country.  
 
There’s only two nations on the planet right 
now that bring that existential threat who have 
a stated purpose of defeating the United 
States. The stated purpose to change the 
world, to change the entire world order, put 
their model on the world order, and not the 
United States model, not the Western model, 
not our ally model, not the NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization] model, and 
that’s Russia and China. Russia and China are 
once again recognized as potential adversaries 
of the United States.  
 
Russia all of a sudden became that adversary 
again in 2014 when they invaded Crimea. In 
2014 they invaded Crimea. They were our 
adversaries then. Somehow that was news. If 
you actually read what the President of Russia 
has said multiple times, as early as 2000. … 
Vladimir Putin was elected President of 
Russia in March of 2000. In April of 2000 he 
gave a speech. In that speech he said they’d 
been watching the United States. They’d been 
watching NATO.  
 
They’ve been watching what we’ve been 
doing in the first Gulf War, in Allied Force. 
Now, this was before 9/11. They hadn’t yet 
seen how we fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
But they understood that we had built this 
unbelievably powerful conventional force. 
And because of that powerful conventional 
force they were going to have to change their 
doctrine and focus on their nuclear and 
strategic capabilities. They were going to 
modernize their nuclear capabilities, and build 
a large number of low-yield nuclear weapons 
as well. They would also reserve the right to 
deploy those low-yield nuclear weapons on a 
battlefield in Europe should Russia be 
challenged. That doctrine began in April of 
2000. 
 
In 2006, Putin announced the full 
modernization of the nuclear force, saying the 
modernization would be done by 2020. I 
won’t tell you the classified numbers, but 
they’re going to be pretty close to being done 
by 2020. They’ve made multiple speeches 
over the time – Putin and the other leadership 
of Russia –that this would be their strategy. 
But somehow they were our friend. They 
were our friend all the way up to 2014 when 
suddenly they became a potential adversary 
again when they invaded Crimea. That was 
just the same part of the strategy they’ve 
announced for the 14 years prior to that ever 
since Putin was elected.  
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This is an adversary we’re going to have to 
deal with, and this is an adversary you’re 
going to have to deal with. And you better 
study your adversary. You better understand 
the way they think, why they think that way, 
what they’re doing. Look at them as an 
adversary. 
 
Look at China. China’s suddenly an adversary 
of the United States again as well. Somehow 
that’s news as well. The first time I wrote 
about China was 1998, and I’ll give you 
warning, if you ever write when you’re going 
to graduate school, you go on to a fellowship, 
or you write a thesis, you better be aware that 
somebody’s actually going to read that 
someday and hold you accountable for what 
you write down. 
 
But, I wrote down in a paper in 1998 what I 
thought China was going to be doing in space 
and what China was going to be doing as far 
as their overall strategy. And you know where 
I got that? I got that from the Chinese 
publications that had been already written. I 
got that from the Chinese students at the 
University of Illinois I was going to school 
with. They stated exactly what they were 
going to do and they’ve been doing it for the 
last 20-plus years without fail on that same 
strategy. You can find everything that they’re 
doing right now in the strategy that was 
written in the 1990s, and we just ignored it as 
a nation. And we helped China build their 
power. Now, China wants to become the 
regional power in the Pacific, and now 
they’ve started to write about being the global 
power by the end of the century.  
 
That’s the world that we live in. Why are they 
building islands in the South China Sea? It’s 
part of that same strategy. Why are they 
building space weapons? It’s part of the same 
strategy. Why are they building aggressive 
cyber capabilities? It’s part of the same 
strategy. And they wrote it down over 20 
years ago. But nobody read it. 
 
So, you better study your adversaries and 
understand the way they think, the way they 
are organized, the way they are trained, and 
the way they’re equipped, because someday 
we may have to deal with them. 
 
The other piece of the puzzle is to somehow 
make sure we never have to deal with them, 
which brings us back to deterrence. The last 
thing we want to do in this world is go to war 
with Russia and China. That’s the last thing 
we want to see happen. If anybody thinks that 
that’s a good thing for the world you don’t 
live in the same world I do. We have to make 
sure that never happens, and you do that with 
deterrence. 
 
So, deterrence in the 21st century has been a 
fascinating discussion. A fascinating 
discussion because of the lack of discussion. 
So, somehow deterrence in the 21st century is 
looked at as STRATCOM’s job. General 
Hyten, you’re the STRATCOM commander, 
deterrence is your job. And if you read the 
Unified Command Plan you’ll find that. 
That’s my number one job, strategic 
deterrence. 
 
Somehow people think that just because we 
have 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons and 
comply with the New START [Strategic 
Arms Reduction] Treaty we deter all our 
adversaries, and all you have to do is pick up 
a newspaper and read just the beginnings of 
that to understand that’s not true. We don’t 
deter all behavior because of the existence of 
nuclear weapons. 
 
So, what is strategic deterrence in the 21st 
century? When I came into command in 2016 
we started asking that question. We built an 
academic alliance with 35 colleges and 
universities to start looking at what is 
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deterrence in the 21st century. And we 
intentionally didn’t give anybody any answers 
when I started just asking the question. What 
is deterrence in the 21st century? Just to try to 
create a debate. And I would go to places that 
fundamentally disagree with the way I think 
about nuclear weapons. I would go to 
Stanford and Yale and Harvard, and I would 
debate the facts with them. I would debate 
with people that have differences of opinion 
to me about what deterrence is in the 21st 
century to try to gather that broader 
discussion of what goes on. 
 
If you want to know where the strategic 
deterrent theory began, it began in colleges 
and universities and the think tanks in this 
country like RAND, in the early 1960s with 
Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling, Bernard 
Brodie, many of the folks that you’ve read in 
your classes here in this institution came from 
that. And when you start thinking about 
deterrence, you go back and read them, 
because there hasn’t really been anybody in 
the 21st century that is of their element. But 
we are starting to see that change. We’re 
starting to see the beginnings of a new debate 
at Georgetown and Stanford and elsewhere, 
about different perspectives of what 
deterrence is in the 21st century.  
 
And here are the elements. Deterrence now is 
a multi-polar problem. Because, you just can’t 
focus on Russia and say New START is a 
global arms reduction treaty. It’s not. It’s just 
two nations. But everything we do with 
Russia impacts China. Everything we do with 
North Korea impacts Russia. Everything we 
do with Russia impacts China. It just goes all 
the way around. So we have to think about 
everything that we do in this multi-polar 
world. 
 
The second piece, it is multi-domain. It is all 
domains. All the domains have to come into 
fruition. And you’ve heard the Air Force 
concept of Multi-Domain Command and 
Control. The Army has a concept called 
Multi-Domain Operations. The Navy is 
working fleet command and control issues. 
All trying to get at the same issue.  
 
But here’s where the challenge really is as we 
go forward. The challenge is how do we 
integrate global capabilities? How do we 
integrate what the Chairman calls global 
fires? Because if we ever get into a conflict 
with an adversary, there’s going to be non-
kinetic and kinetic shooting happening in 
space, cyber, air, land and sea all at the same 
time, and we have to figure out how with 
multiple commanders involved we integrate 
all those capabilities together.  
 
So, you want to know what you have to do in 
order to become a great joint officer? Just 
become a great Airman. This institution is not 
building great joint warriors. That will happen 
down the road. We’re getting you ready to be 
Airmen.  
 
Now, there are other services in this room that 
are going as exchange programs in here. 
When you go back to your service, whatever 
service you came from, become a great 
Soldier, a great Sailor, a great Airman, a great 
Marine, because what I want as a joint 
commander is I want to pull the best domain 
expertise I can from every domain that we 
operate in, put them all together in a room and 
then figure out how to fight together 
effectively in all those domains. But what I 
don’t want, is I don’t want somebody that 
knows a little bit about every domain. I want 
a room full of people that know everything 
about each domain and then we’ll figure out 
how to pull those pieces together.  
 
So, the first thing you’ve got to do is become 
an expert in whatever career field you’re 
going into. If you’re going to be a pilot, 
become the best pilot in the United States Air 
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Force. And if you’re going to be a pilot, that 
should be your goal. Not just be a good pilot, 
but be the best pilot in the United States Air 
Force. The best pilot in the United States 
military. If you’re going into space, become 
the best space warrior there is. If you’re going 
into cyber, become a cyber killer. If you’re 
going into intel, become the best intel 
operator there is. If you’re going into 
acquisition, if you’re going into engineering, 
become the best. Learn that. That’s what you 
have to do for the next 10 years. Then when 
the time comes we’re going to take that 
expertise and we’re going to put it to use. But 
you should never lose that expertise because 
that will define who you are. And in your 
soul, in your heart as you go forward into the 
future, you need to resonate those values. 
Because when I look at myself in the mirror, 
even though I’m a joint commander, even 
though I command Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, 
Marines, my professional identity is an 
Airman, and it always will be. That’s the way 
it’s got to be. 
 
And yes, I have a deep space background. 
And a couple of weeks ago, the day after I 
was supposed to be here the last time when I 
left because of the storm that came in, I was 
testifying with my bosses, the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
the Secretary of the Air Force, in front of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on the 
future of space, and I know that subject well. I 
have a vision of what that future’s going to 
be. We’re going to make space a real 
warfighting domain because it basically 
already is. The rest of the world just doesn’t 
understand it. We’re going to walk into it.  
 
But, I was challenged about my background 
as an Airman, whether the Air Force was the 
right place for space. I said, you understand 
that when I bleed, I bleed blue because I am 
an Airman through and through. But I know 
we have also reached the point where space 
has to be treated as its own domain, just like 
the air was, just like the maritime domain 
was, because it is a place where we’re going 
to fight and it’s a place we’re going to have to 
win, an Air Force that we’re going to build 
around it, and I believe the fact that it’s still 
going to be in the United States Air Force is 
exactly right.  
 
We’re going to get into Q&A in a minute, and 
that’s my favorite part, so we’re going to have 
plenty of time for Q&A. But I would ask you 
to identify yourself. I’m going to ask you 
some questions here and I don’t want you to 
raise your hand, I don’t want you to 
embarrass yourself, I don’t want you do 
anything stupid. But I’m just going to ask you 
some basic questions that every Airman 
should know the answer to. This is our 
history. This is our history as a United States 
Air Force and you should know these names 
off the back of your hand. And if we’re not 
teaching you these names at the Air Force 
Academy we’re doing something wrong. But 
this is the basics of who we are. 
 
I’m going to ask you the easy question first. 
That is, who is the father of space and 
missiles in the United States Air Force? 
That’s the easy one. That’s Gen. Bernard 
Schriever.  
 
Gen. Bernard Schriever basically invented the 
ICBM. He invented the spy satellite. He 
invented the rocket inside the military. He’s 
the guy that was there. One of my great 
experiences of my life was as a young major 
to be told by the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, Gen. [Merrill] Tony McPeak – I was 
the idiot major in that story, by the way, but I 
don’t need to go into that. But going to 
Andrews get a C-21, taking off to California, 
pick up Gen. Schriever and take him to places 
X, Y, and Z and show him what we’re doing 
in space in the United States Air Force. 
General Schriever was criticizing the Air 
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Force and General McPeak. I got to sit in the 
back of that C-21 and receive a lecture from 
Gen. Schriever that I’ll never forget because 
he told me how we were screwing up in the 
Air Force, not treating space the way it should 
be treated. So he was the father of space and 
missiles. 
 
Here’s a second question. I’m going to make 
you raise your hand real quick. How many in 
here are aerospace engineers? A bunch of 
you. Who invented the term aerospace? 
<pause>  
 
Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force, fourth chief of staff, 1959. A 
hearing in front of Congress. Eight times 
during the hearing he used the term 
‘aerospace,’ as the indivisible spectrum of 
operations from air to space that has to 
happen for the United States Air Force to 
control the high ground of the future.  
 
A funny story-- Gen. [Dwight] Beach, an 
Army general testifying a short time later. 
They asked General Beach, General White 
keeps using this term aerospace. What do you 
think about that term? And seriously, you can 
look it up in the Congressional Record, 
General Beach goes, “I always heard of 
armospace.”  
 
Armospace didn’t stick. Aerospace stuck. 
Because air and space are the areas we have 
to control. 
 
Who is the general most responsible for 
creating Air Force Space Command? The 
command I commanded until 2016. Gen. 
[Jerome] Jerry O’Malley, commander of 
Tactical Air Command. The fighter pilot’s 
fighter pilot. When he was a wing commander 
at Beale, he flew the SR-71, the U-2, he got 
read into these classified space programs, and 
he looked at it and said there’s all this space 
stuff going on but none of it gets to the 
warfighter. So, when he became the XO 
[director for operations] of the Air Force, now 
the A3 of the Air Force, he started working 
with the chiefs of staff, one of them being 
[Gen.] Lew Allen, and said we need to create 
a command that is focused on the operational 
application of space to the battlefield. That 
would be Air Force Space Command. 
 
Here’s the thing about those three people – 
General Schriever, General White, General 
O’Malley – they were all fighter pilots. They 
were all pilots. And somehow the popular 
culture has reached the point where somehow 
the world doesn’t think that pilots care about 
space and that’s so untrue. Not only do they 
care about space, our chief of staff cares about 
space as much as anybody I know; the general 
officers I work with care about space as much 
as anybody I know. But it was actually 
invented by pilots because that was the future 
of the United States Air Force. That’s where 
we’re going to go. And everyone in this room 
should be able to tell that story. 
 
And what is it all about? It’s all about our 
nation’s most important mission. It’s all about 
strategic deterrence in the 21st century, 
because strategic deterrence is going to come 
from being able to control the air, control 
space, control cyberspace, having a nuclear 
deterrent that is ready and able to respond to 
any threat. That is the structure that we’re 
going to have. That’s where it all comes 
together. And that’s what you need to know 
when you go into the Air Force and you 
become second lieutenants. And you’re not 
going to think about it for a while. You’re just 
going to think about flying planes, and 
operating satellites and operating in 
cyberspace, and providing intel and building 
stuff. That’s what you’re going to think about 
for the next decade and that’s great.  
 
But if you remember nothing else from today, 
remember that we have adversaries in this 
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world that we don’t want to go to war with. 
The only way to avoid that war is be ready to 
go to war and to defeat them in a war on any 
day that the nation requires us to. That’s what 
we’re supposed to do in the United States Air 
Force. That’s what we’re supposed to do at 
STRATCOM. That’s what we’re supposed to 
do in the United States military, and we need 
to be ready to do that. 
 
I will stop there and just say thanks for the 
decision that you’ve made to come to this 
institution. Thanks for what you’re about to 
do as you go forward into whatever service, 
whatever nation, whatever structure you’re 
going into. But if you’re going into the Air 
Force, understand that we just want you to be 
great Airmen, because great Airmen and great 
Soldiers, great Sailors, great Marines are what 









 Article  
 
 
Duffer’s Drift and Space Operations 
 
Roger Wortman 
Defence of Duffer’s Drift, a popular Boer War tale among British infantry officers, teaches lessons for the 
future of space operations. 
 
 
Published in the early 20th Century, The 
Defence of Duffer’s Drift is a work of fiction 
written as an educational tool for small unit 
leaders.1 The novella outlines the experiences 
of a young lieutenant and his tumultuous path 
to success when charged with defending key 
terrain. Told through a series of dreams, 
Duffer’s Drift provides multiple tactical 
lessons through an iterative process, each 
building on the previous sequence. The 
officer fails multiple times while learning 
from various mistakes while incrementally 
moving toward success.2  Although the work 
focuses on ground combat and maneuver 
warfare, the principles addressed can be 
applied to a variety of fields. As such, 
Duffer’s Drift is often suggested as 
professional development reading for many 
service members regardless of career field.3 
The author, British Army Captain Ernest 
Dunlop Swinton, based the story on his own 
experiences during the Boer War of 1899-
1902. Although Duffer’s Drift draws from 
Swinton’s days as a small unit leader, lessons 
within the tale move beyond tactical 
considerations and reinforce a wide array of 
combined arms principles. This enriches the 
story while also foretelling Swinton’s 
eventual career progression as a professor, 
historian, war correspondent, and a forefather 
of armored warfare. Eventually attaining the 
rank of Major General, Swinton retired in 
                                                          
1 Roger Wortman is a civilian analyst with the U.S. 
Space Force.  This article was written and submitted 
prior to him joining the service. 
2 Swinton, Ernest, “The Defence of Duffer’s Drift,” 
Department of Defense FMFRP 12-33, 1989. First 
published 1904. 
1919 and is considered one of Britain’s 
leading military thinkers. 4 
The structure and flow of Duffer’s Drift is 
reminiscent of a short autobiography vice an 
instructional pamphlet. Its first person 
narrative invites the reader to trust the 
author’s authenticity while remaining open to 
the ideas and education provided through 
each dream sequence. Its time loop plot 
device is instantly recognizable by modern 
readers, although Swinton’s pacing and 
adjustments through each dream enable the 
story to unfold naturally while avoiding 
needless repetition. At thirty-two pages, 
Duffer’s Drift uses this simple and effective 
storytelling technique to educate the reader on 
the complexities of ground warfare. 
Additionally, this literary approach provides 
easy to absorb lessons and professional 
education for all ranks and career fields. 
 
LESSONS OF DUFFER’S DRIFT 
 
The story’s protagonist, Lieutenant 
Backsight Forethought, leads a light infantry 
unit deployed to southern Africa in service of 
the British Empire. Although the backdrop for 
Duffer’s Drift is the Boer War circa early 
1900s, the tale avoids commentary on 
geopolitical issues or reasoning for the 
3 Baker, Deane-Peter, “'Dreams of Battle': A Small 
Window into the Evolution of Us Army Tactical 
Ethics, 1921-2009,” Journal of Military Ethics 13, no. 
4 (2014): 302.  
4 Tucker, S., 500 Great Military Leaders, ABC-CLIO, 
LLC, 2014. 
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conflict.5  Instead, the focal point of the story 
is how the officer navigates the complexities 
of warfare. The story itself begins with the 
lieutenant falling asleep after arriving at a 
river fording site he and his fifty men are 
charged with defending. Each vivid dream 
sequence pertains to the defense of the drift; 
and each sequence results in disaster for the 
lieutenant’s men and mission. Yet, as the 
dreams progress, the lieutenant applies 
lessons learned to the subsequent scenario. A 
clear example is seen in the first dream 
sequence and its influence in decisions made 
in the second iteration. 
 
In the first dream the lieutenant waits until the 
next day to begin defensive preparations. 
Sentries are placed around his forces to 
provide security; though little thought is 
employed to their positions. He allows local 
salesmen into the encampment to barter with 
his men. Tents are erected in plain view and 
consolidated. The enemy soon arrives; the 
battle is quick and destructive. The British 
element sustains multiple casualties and those 
who survive become prisoners. Reviewing his 
actions during defensive preparations, the 
lieutenant identifies four lessons learned:6  
- Do not delay in preparing defenses. 
- Placement and concealment of sentries is 
critical. 
- Do not allow anyone other than your 
own forces into the perimeter. 
- Concealment in tents does not provide 
cover. 
The second dream serves as a reset of the 
battlefield. With a fresh complement of forces 
                                                          
5 Melissa and Michelle Tusan, “Fault Lines of Loyalty: 
Kipling's Boer War Conflict/War and the Victorians: 
Response,” Victorian Studies 58, no. 2 (Winter, 2016): 
314-31. 
at his disposal, the lieutenant incorporates 
previous lessons. He begins defensive 
preparations immediately, keeps locals out, 
properly prepares sentries, and ensures his 
men can fit into the entrenchments to defend 
against enemy fires. The enemy eventually 
attacks, and Lieutenant BF’s unit is again 
overrun. However, the lieutenant reviews 
what happened and identifies lessons learned 
to be applied at the third iteration. 
The series of dreams ends after six cycles, 
each building on previous events. Throughout 
the novella concepts such as defense against 
heavy weaponry, operational security, 
management of the local population, seizing 
the initiative, and many others are identified 
by the lieutenant. Every learning point is 
incorporated in the following defensive plan, 
and on the sixth dream the British defense 
succeeds. Despite this story being over one 
hundred years old, The Defence of Duffer’s 
Drift remains relevant to modern battlefields.7  
The iterative nature of the narrative structure 
combined with an almost scientific approach 
to testing and validation proves its value as an 
educational tool and timeless classic for any 
maneuver warfare officer. Moreover, the 
lessons included in Duffer’s Drift are not 
limited to educating infantry professionals. 
Concepts such as placement of forces, 
operational security, involvement of local 
populations and more are facets of warfare 
that apply to every career field, even space 
professionals. 
 
VALIDITY IN THE SPACE DOMAIN  
 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
conceptualizes battlespace in a variety of 
domains. The traditional realms of land, air, 
6 Swinton, Ernest, “The Defence of Duffer’s Drift,” 
Department of Defense FMFRP 12-33, 1989. First 
published 1904. 
7 Merritt, Braden, “Modern Relevance of the Defence 
of Duffer’s Drift,” United States Naval Institute. 
Proceedings 132, no. 8 (08, 2006): 64-5. 
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and sea are the most widely known. These 
domains are not intended to be examined 
independently, but rather collectively to 
understand interdependencies during conflict. 
Recently, the domains of cyber and space 
were added to reinforce their importance to 
modern military operations.8 
 
The space domain is highly technical and can 
be intimidating to the uninitiated. Space 
operations involve orbital mechanics, 
communication linkages, relay sites on the 
ground, and airborne assets.9  Space 
operations are replete with the latest 
technology, but they are not necessarily 
unique in tactics and strategy. At high levels, 
space operations succeed in the same manner 
as any other military force. They must ensure 
mission readiness while maintaining 
survivability. Maneuver forces use the term, 
‘shoot, move, communicate’ as a sort of 
mantra when operating in a battlespace. Space 
assets are no different. Space focused units 
must be able to ensure each asset can 
accomplish its designed mission (shoot), 
reposition for the next objective (move), and 
synchronize actions to reinforce unity of 
effort (communicate). The ways and means 
that space focused units accomplish this are 
varied due to the exoatmospheric nature of the 
mission, but fundamentals are the same. 
Although Swinton focused his teaching points 
on tactical/operational concepts such as fields 
of fire, points of domination, and unity of 
effort, a wider examination reveals valuable 
insights into educating space professionals. 
Collectively, the lessons in Duffer’s Drift can 
be cataloged into three overarching themes 
applicable to space operations: initiative, 
                                                          
8 Behling, Thomas G., “Ensuring a Stable Space 
Domain for the 21st Century,” Joint Force Quarterly 
no. 47 (Fourth, 2007): 105-8. 
9 Department of Defense, JP 3-14 Space Operations, 
Washington, D.C., April 2018. 
operational security, and battlefield 
positioning. Analyzing each of these themes 
through the lens of space operations shows 
how Swinton’s novella applies to the space 




Initiative is critical for land operations. In 
Duffer’s Drift, this is addressed in two ways. 
First, the lieutenant delays preparing defenses 
until the next morning. This decision results 
in lost time, effort, and opportunity toward 
establishing a foothold along the river. The 
result for the British forces is disastrous due 
to ill preparedness. Although space operations 
do not involve construction of parapets, they 
do necessitate defensive protections against 
an adversary.10  From a strategic perspective 
the lesson of initiative (while on the 
defensive) manifests in assessing enemy 
capabilities and including countermeasures 
during the satellite design phase. To support 
this, coordination between research and 
development (R&D) professionals and the 
intelligence community can ensure 
appropriate threat mitigation capabilities are 
included in new space assets.11 For the space 
community, seizing the initiative means 
investing in early stages of the R&D cycle, so 
officers never have to wait until after 
experiencing catastrophe to develop new 
countermeasures. 
 
A second example comes later in the story 
when the lieutenant and his men fail to exploit 
an opportunity to strike first. The enemy is at 
first unaware of British positions, and an 
initial volley of rifle fire could turn the battle 
in the defenders’ favor. Yet, the lieutenant 
10 Hamre, John, "Challenges We Face in the National 
Security Space Domain," Hampton Roads 
International Security Quarterly (Feb 19, 2017): 14. 
11 Sharma, Surinder Paul, "U.S. Government Program 
Managers' Competencies to Manage Satellite 
Acquisition Programs," Order No. 10603364, 
Northcentral University, 2017. 
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does not give the order. An opportunity to 
seize the initiative is lost, and disaster ensues. 
While U.S. space assets are not yet equipped 
with strike capability, a linkage to the lesson 
on initial fires still applies: allocating 
satellites at the earliest point of sufficient 
information.  
Space capabilities are primarily an enabling 
function for other domains. Whether 
providing positioning/navigation/timing 
services, relaying critical communications, 
remote sensing, or other functions, satellites 
require a great deal of planning and 
coordination.12 The lesson from Duffer’s 
Drift, then, is to identify and prepare assets at 
the earliest possible point of oncoming 
conflict. By rapidly taking action, the space 
community can ensure appropriate platforms 
are available when needed, enabling those 




A clear example from Duffer’s Drift of an 
operational security lesson involves a local 
trader. The trader seeks an opportunity to sell 
his wares to the British soldiers. The 
lieutenant not only allows this man to trade, 
but he lets him bring his items into camp. It is 
only when this dream series is complete that 
the lieutenant realizes his mistake. The trader 
has reported the location of the camp, its 
internal defenses, strength of the British 
compliment, weapons available, and other 
forms of valuable information to the enemy 
commander. Undetected, the lieutenant let a 
spy into camp. The lesson here is one which 
applies not only to space operations, but to 
any field or industry, be wary of who, 
regardless of uniform, has access to sensitive 
information.  
                                                          
12 Goirigolzarri, Benjamin L., "A Need for Speed? 
Identifying the Effects of Space Acquisition Timelines 
on Space Deterrence and Conflict Outcomes," Order 
No. 27541013, Pardee RAND Graduate School, 2019. 
Space operations dazzle with high technology 
satellites and large launch vehicles, but the 
central node of any organization is always 
people. Monitoring who has access to 
sensitive sites and plans is a requirement for 
any leader. Swinton’s lesson for space 
professionals can be expanded to include 
network access, information sharing, 
operations planning, asset capabilities, and 
much more. This is especially important in 
today’s globalized society. Meeting the 
multitude of threats across the globe requires 
partnership and cooperation.13 It is imperative 
to balance the good faith effort of cooperating 
with multinational coalitions against the 
priority of ensuring security protocols for 
protecting space capabilities. 
 
Battlefield Positioning 
The story of Duffer’s Drift is a defensive 
one. The lieutenant is charged to defend 
terrain with a small force against a potentially 
larger enemy. Tactics in this type of operation 
are different from an assault or raid. Solid 
defense relies on being able to withstand 
overwhelming firepower. In each dream from 
the story—except the last—British forces, 
despite their previous training, succumb to 
enemy violence. Many of the lessons in 
Swinton’s tale, then, focus on how to defend 
properly and ensure that each soldier is best 
able to survive the fight. In the story, ultimate 
success is accomplished through optimal 
positioning of forces. Terrain dictates much of 
the defense, and issues such as dead space in 
fields of fire, proximity to enemy front lines, 
and spacing of men are all examined in detail. 
 
Of particular relevance to space operations is 
a lesson addressing flanking. In the story, the 
lieutenant and his men lose control of the 
battle. The enemy maneuvers forces to the 
13 Moller, Sara Bjerg, "Fighting Friends: Institutional 
Cooperation and Military Effectiveness in 
Multinational War," Order No. 10099567, Columbia 
University, 2016. 
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flanks of British defenses. Chaos ensues as 
the lieutenant’s men receive hostile fire from 
multiple angles. Lack of protection on the 
flanks along with inadequate planning for that 
scenario results in yet another massacre at the 
hands of the enemy. Once again, the 
lieutenant is forced to analyze in detail how 
he failed. Protecting a flank is, of course, a 
basic consideration for any ground officer. 
Maritime and air components are concerned 
about this threat as well. Space is no different. 
 
Although space is big, it is also, in terms of 
competitive interactions, crowded. There are 
multiple actors, both government and private, 
operating in space.14 There is an obvious 
terrestrial threat from ground-launched 
antisatellite weapon systems, but that is not 
the only front. In fact, where orbital assets are 
concerned, the “front,” and by implication 
vulnerable flanks, are everywhere. Space 
professionals should keep this lesson in mind 
when planning operations. Kinetic attacks 
from the planet are not the only way to defeat 
an orbital asset. Attacks can come from the 
digital realm in the form of cyber. Laser 
technology has developed and diffused 
rapidly, and as a result it can interfere with 
satellite operations from multiple directions. 
Jamming signals along an entire spectrum are 
another threat from either ground or space-
based assets.15 The architecture of space 
operations is expanding so fast that every 
conceivable attack vector can be considered a 
satellite or constellation “flank.” 
 
AN OVERARCHING LESSON 
 
Tucked between the pages of Swinton’s 
novella are additional lessons for use in 
professional development. Each is clearly 
explained after the dream sequence and 
incorporated into the next defense. In 
                                                          
14 Morin, Jamie, “Four Steps to Global Management of 
Space Traffic,” Nature 567, no. 7746 (Mar 07, 2019): 
25-7. 
addition, Duffer’s Drift provides general 
guidance that is less explicit. These lessons 
and guides apply to every field regardless of 
service and can be incorporated in every 
leader’s approach. 
 
The novella, for example, implies the 
lieutenant is fresh out of military education 
and training. He is depicted as determined to 
use his recently acquired knowledge to the 
fullest extent possible. Yet, it is clear the 
lieutenant is flummoxed when his training 
does not provide direct, formulaic solutions 
for his mission. To reinforce the idea, 
Swinton includes this quote, “Now if they had 
given me a job like fighting the Battle of 
Waterloo…or Bull Run, I knew all about that, 
as I had crammed it up....”   
 
Although critical for the narrative and used to 
underscore the lieutenant’s irritation in the 
moment, there are deeper lessons to be drawn. 
First, knowing military history and gaming 
the intricacies of simulated battles does not 
guarantee success. Studying a variety of 
tactical, operational, and strategic actions in 
any battle scenario helps tell that conflict’s 
story; however, those solutions are guaranteed 
only to those battles. Each war has its unique 
aspects, variables, and constraints, limiting 
the reach of military science. The lesson 
Swinton is explaining with this quote is to 
work the problem of the current fight, 
recognizing it has its own set of variables, not 
just fresh parameters in the same old formula. 
It is still important to appreciate the historical 
record or summary statistics from thousands 
of simulation runs, but these can never be 
useful unless officers retain their skepticism:  
at some point the record will fall short since it 
cannot emulate actual fighting conditions. 
 
15 Johnson-Freese, Joan, Space Warfare in the 21st 
Century: Arming the Heavens, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2016. 
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The lesson is especially important for today’s 
fledgling space community. The U.S. Space 
Force is [sic] shy of its first birthday, but it 
claims mature strategic importance with direct 
representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.16 
Its presence on this august council 
emphasizes the growing role of space 
capabilities in U.S. strategic thinking. Prior to 
the creation of USSF, space activities were 
dispersed throughout the services. Each 
branch of the military held its own space 
interests and operations.17 The U.S. Air Force 
(USAF) was the largest contingent with a 
variety of units and roles related to space 
falling under its mission. As such, the military 
space community, always a joint venture, was 
nonetheless dominated by USAF operations 
and culture.  
 
Naturally, USSF will bring much of this 
culture and business process to its new 
service, which remains within the Department 
of the Air Force. However, the independent 
JCS seat signals USSF will not be a simple 
extension of the Air Force.18 Space Force 
faces qualitatively new challenges and will be 
compelled to develop its own approaches to 
frame and solve these military problems. The 
deep well of USAF business practices 
combined with collective experience of the 
partner services will support USSF as it 
evolves. Still, it is crucial for this new 
organization to balance legacy processes with 
tailored solutions in the midst of unrelenting 
operations tempo.  
 
The pensive lieutenant facing a novel 
challenge at Duffer’s Drift, through his 
dreaming (that can be read as gaming) applied 
his imagination to expand his real-life 
chronological hours for iteration and 
refinement of traditional tactics. Likewise, 
USSF relative to older branches ought to 
leave its door unusually open to investment in 
the demanding legwork of testing new ideas 
and radical concepts even as it 
professionalizes the service.  
 
In the years since Swinton’s story was 
published, a great many aspects of warfare 
have changed, of course. Weapons are 
deadlier. Communication has increased in 
speed and volume. Points on the globe are 
closer due to faster means of transportation. 
Access to space for the United States has 
become a routine expectation. These advances 
obscure but do not undermine the validity of 
Swinton’s lessons. If anything, they make 
them more urgent. Space is not yet 
weaponized, but it must be considered in the 
context of military operations, subject to 
analysis through the lens of geopolitical 
conflict. Swinton’s classic story of a young 
lieutenant faced with a complex, evolving 
mission can serve as a contemporary tool for 
space professionals, an early guide to how 
they can defend this critical domain. 
 
   
 
                                                          
16 Opening Statement by Ranking Member Reed at 
SASC Hearing to Hear Proposal to Establish a United 
States Space Force, Washington: Federal Information 
& News Dispatch, LLC, 2019. 
17 Tyler, Coley D., “Demystifying Space: How to 
Perform Better in the Space Domain,” Infantry 
(Online) 107, no. 4 (Oct. 2018): 16-9. 
18 Opening Statement by Ranking Member Reed at 
SASC Hearing to Hear Proposal to Establish a United 
States Space Force, Washington: Federal Information 
& News Dispatch, LLC, 2019. 
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Deterrence in Cyberspace: A Game-Theoretic Approach 
 
Abderrahmane Sokri 
This novel application of the Stackelberg leader-follower game from economic theory illuminates 
situational constraints that point to a sweet spot, an optimal level of investment in cyber defense, for 
deterrence by denial.    
 
 
Deterrence is a form of persuasion 
intended to manipulate the cost-benefit 
analysis of would-be attackers and convince 
them that the cost of taking an action against 
the defender outweighs its potential benefit 
(Brantly, 2018; Wilner, 2017).1 It is the 
prevention (of a target) from committing 
unwanted behavior by fear of the 
consequences (United States (US) 
Department of Defense (DoD), 2008; Taipale, 
2010). Deterrence differs from compellence 
by focusing on prevention using ex ante 
actions. Compellence uses power to force an 
adversary, post hoc, to take a desired action 
under threat of possible escalation in the 
future (Brantly, 2018). 
 
Two types of deterrence are generally used: 
deterrence by punishment and deterrence by 
denial. Deterrence by punishment hinges on 
the threat of retaliation against a potential 
attacker. This tit-for-tat or equivalent 
retaliation strategy adds to the attacker’s 
perceived cost. Deterrence by denial sends a 
signal to potential challengers that they will 
be unsuccessful. This impenetrability strategy 
subtracts from the attacker’s perceived 
benefits. 
 
In the physical world, deterrence aims to 
dissuade specific actions against physical 
assets. In this space, the most common form 
of deterrence by punishment is the use of 
nuclear weapons. These weapons are 
inherently an existential threat against 
                                                          
1 Abderrahmane Sokri is data scientist at Defence 
Research and Development Canada, Center for 
potential challengers (Brodie et al., 1946; 
Brantly, 2018). An all-out nuclear war could 
be threatened but never fought to achieve 
reasonable political objectives (Freedman, 
2004; Brantly, 2018). Deterrence by denial 
may include tightening defense around a 
critical infrastructure to deny attacker access. 
The target can be tightly defended by 
installing, for example, more security 
mechanisms and higher walls. 
 
In the cyber domain, deterrence is more 
complex than in the physical domain. Digital 
attacks go beyond geographic and political 
boundaries. They are generally highly 
dynamic and imperceptible to the human 
senses (Moisan and Gonzalez, 2017; Sokri, 
2019b). A cyber-attack may result in 
interception, degradation, modification, 
interruption, fabrication, or unauthorized use 
of an information asset. The information asset 
can be physically (e.g., hardware) or logically 
(e.g., software) based (Sokri, 2019a). 
 
Cyber-attacks can be segregated into two 
main categories: targeted attack and 
opportunistic attack. A targeted attack 
requires a large effort and has the potential to 
cause significant damage to the defender. 
Denial of service and theft of information are 
typical targeted attacks. In contrast, an 
opportunistic attack has a number of 
intermediate targets, requires a small effort, 
and tends to cause less damage. A virus and 
spam e-mail are typical opportunistic attacks.  
Operational Research and Analysis. Copyright for this 
article remains with the Crown, Canada. 
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The most challenging problem in cyber 
deterrence is the attribution dilemma (Wilner, 
2017). Determining who to blame for an 
attack may be very difficult and time-
consuming to do. Consequently, the 
credibility of any deterrence by punishment in 
digital space will depend on the blame 
attribution. (Glaser, 2011; Brantly, 2018). 
Since deterrence by denial does not require 
identification of potential attackers, it can be 
used to mitigate this dependency (Bordelon, 
2016). 
 
Cyber risk is present when a given threat 
meets a vulnerability in an information 
system allowing it to manifest. In this context, 
a threat is a potential cause of an unwanted 
occurrence while a vulnerability is a 
weakness in the information system (Sokri, 
2019a; Zhang, 2012; Bowen et al., 2006). To 
minimize digital risk against an information 
asset, the defender should know at least two 
elements: (1) the probability of a successful 
attack and (2) the corresponding potential loss 
(Brantly, 2018; Glaser, 2011; Schneidewind, 
2011; Branagan, 2012).   
 
To protect their information assets against 
offensive cyber-attacks, policy makers are 
increasingly gravitating towards deterrence by 
denial (Taipale, 2010). A key decision-
variable in digital deterrence by denial is the 
defender investment level in security. To 
protect a potential target, the defender can 
reduce the probability of a successful attack 
by investing in information security. The 
investment may, for example, reduce the 
vulnerability of the target.  
 
The aim of this paper is to show how 
deterrence by denial as a defense strategy can 
be formulated in cyberspace using a 
sequential game with a disclosure mechanism. 
It shows the suitability of game theory to 
cyber deterrence. The paper extends existing 
models by providing a new game formulation 
of deterrence using a more intuitive 
probability of a successful attack. It also 
combines stochastic simulation and game-
theoretic approaches to handle uncertainty in 
the input data. A simulation could, for 
example, incorporate uncertainty on the 
model variables and parameters by changing 
their static values to statistical distributions.  
 
Consider a sequential security game played 
between two adversarial agents: a defender D 
(the leader) and a strategic attacker A (the 
follower). The defender anticipates the 
attacker’s reaction, determines, and credibly 
communicates the security investment to 
protect an information system. The defender 
can, for example, publicly release his level of 
investment in (1) detection and prevention 
techniques such as Antivirus software, 
Firewalls, and Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS) and (2) physical monitoring and 
inspection procedures (Sokri, 2019b). 
Revenue agencies usually use this tactic by 
revealing their auditing strategies to deter tax 
evasion (Cavusoglu et al., 2008). 
 
The attacker observes the defender’s decision 
and reacts with a certain level of willingness-
to-attack. The true willingness-to-attack is 
latent and, therefore, not directly observable. 
It is modeled as the expected effort to be 
exerted by the attacker to compromise the 
system. The attacker’s effort corresponds to 
the first activities of the cyber kill chain 
(Mihai et al., 2014). These activities 
particularly include (but are not limited to): 
1. Reconnaissance – the process of 
collecting information about the 
system, 
2. Weaponization – the process of 
analyzing the collected data to select 
the appropriate attack technique, and 
3. Delivery – the process of 
transmitting the weapon to the 
targeted system. 
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Following this introduction, section 2, below, 
provides a comprehensive review of literature 
on security investment as a deterrence factor. 
Section 3, sets up a new game theoretic model 
of deterrence in cyberspace. Section 4, 
computes the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Section 5 offers a formal discussion about the 
main results. Some concluding remarks are 




Identifying and understanding the 
factors influencing the decision to invest in 
information security is a key requirement for 
any effective deterrence and risk management 
in cyberspace. These factors form the pillars 
of the appropriate level of security 
investment. Security investment as a 
deterrence factor has been an active research 
area in the last decade. This literature can be 
divided into two main categories: decision 
theory and game theory approaches 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2008). 
 
The decision-theoretic approach uses 
traditional risk analysis and cost–benefit 
perspectives for security investment 
decisions. This approach assesses the risk 
associated with security breaches and 
conducts a cost-benefit analysis to determine 
a certain level of security investment to 
mitigate the risk. While this approach can 
assess the economic value of intangible costs 
and benefits, it has two main limitations: (1) It 
does not determine the optimal security 
investment level. (2) It does not allow a 
defender’s security investment to influence 
the attacker’s behaviour. 
 
Al-Humaigani and Dunn (2003), for example, 
proposed a model to quantify the return on 
security investment (ROSI). The authors 
enumerated the fundamental components of 
ROSI for every organization and security 
threat. They included what it costs to invest in 
information security spending (e.g., the cost 
of procuring the security tool or software, the 
losses in reputation and goodwill). They 
incorporated both the pre- and post- system 
implementation security measures. 
 
In order to come through the first limitation of 
the decision-theoretic approach, Gordon and 
Loeb (2002) presented an economic model 
that determines the optimal amount to invest 
in information security. Their results indicate 
that defenders may be better off concentrating 
their efforts on information assets with 
midrange vulnerabilities. Extremely 
vulnerable information assets may be very 
expensive to protect. For some broad classes 
of security breach probability functions, 
results also indicate that optimal investment 
never exceeds 37% of the expected loss. 
Hausken (2006) examined the effect of 
different returns assumptions on the optimal 
level of investment. The author showed that 
optimal investment level may no longer be 
capped at 37% of expected loss. For an 
alternative class of security breach probability 
functions, the optimal investment can increase 
convexly in vulnerability and exceed 37%. 
 
More recently, Mayadunne and Park (2016) 
used the expected utility approach to analyze 
information security investment decisions. 
They provided a comparison between the 
decisions made by a risk taking and a risk 
neutral decision maker. They found, for 
example, that for a group of information 
assets with equal value and varying 
vulnerabilities, the risk neutral decision maker 
will diversify security investment to a greater 
extent and the risk taker will invest a larger 
amount when protecting the high risk assets in 
the group. 
 
The game-theoretical approach uses game 
oriented models to capture the strategic 
interactions between rational attackers and 
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defenders. Optimal investment in security is 
one of the defenders’ resulting strategies. This 
approach has two main challenges: (1) 
Validity of the game-theoretic assumptions in 
cyberspace (e.g., rationality of players). (2) 
Complexity of the cyber domain scenarios 
(e.g., dynamic attacks and complex 
networks). 
 
Cavusoglu et al. (2008), for example, argued 
that the old decision-theoretic approach is 
incomplete because it does not take into 
account the strategic nature of the interaction 
between attackers and defenders. The authors 
used a game-theoretic model to determine the 
optimal security investment level. Results 
indicate that the defender generally enjoys a 
higher payoff than that in the decision theory 
approach. The gap between the two results 
decreases over time and the rate of 
convergence depends on the defender learning 
model. 
 
Wu et al. (2015) used game theory to model 
the relationship between the optimal 
information security investment and the 
characteristics of defenders’ security 
environment. Results indicate that defenders 
are better off not investing in security (outside 
best practices) until the potential loss reaches 
a certain value. They should focus on the 
midrange of intrinsic vulnerabilities. When 
the potential loss is catastrophic, they should 
adopt other measures and stop investing in 
security. 
 
More recently, Pan et al. (2017) suggested an 
optimal investment strategy using a game-
theoretic framework. The authors concluded 
that the defender is better off using a single 
security level to protect all the information 
assets instead of using different security 
levels to protect different assets. The 
interested reader is referred to Sokri (2019a) 
and Sokri (2019b) for further information on 





The system is characterized by an 
inherent vulnerability 𝑣0. Each successful 
attack can result in a potential loss l to the 
defender and a possible benefit b to the 
attacker. The loss/benefit occurring can be 
tangible (e.g., monetary loss/benefit) or 
intangible (e.g., loss/gain in reputation).  
 
Probability of a successful attack 
Let 𝑖 be the defender’s security 
investment and 𝑡 the attacker’s level of effort 
to expend in hacking the defender. The 
compound probability p of a successful attack 
can be expressed as the product of the 
probability that the vulnerability may be 
exploited, 𝑣(𝑖), and the threat probability 
(i.e., the probability to receive an attack) (Wu 
et al, 2015): 
(1)     𝑝 = 𝑣(𝑖) (1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
𝑡
𝜇
 )),   
where the expected effort 𝑡 can be expressed 
in terms of time. The threat probability, also 
known as the probability of attack (prior to 
information about target vulnerability), is 
written in Equation 1 as the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of an 
exponentially distributed random variable 
evaluated at 𝑡. This CDF estimates the 
probability that the attacker’s level of effort 
will be less than 𝑡. The parameter 𝜇 represents 
the mean effort to attack (e.g., investigation, 
identification, weaponization done prior to 
knowledge of target defenses). It also 
represents the standard deviation of the 
distribution. 
 
As in Wu et al. (2015), the defender’s security 
investment does not directly affect the 
inherent threat probability. The defender can 
only reduce the first term, probability that the 
vulnerability may be exploited, using security 
investment 𝑖. That is, 
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(2)     𝑣(𝑖) = 𝑣0 exp(−𝛼𝑖),     
 
where the parameter 𝛼 > 0. Straightforward 
derivation leads to 
(3)     
𝑣′(𝑖)
𝑣(𝑖)
= −𝛼,     
which means that the parameter 𝛼 is the decay 
rate of the probability that the vulnerability 
may be exploited. It represents the rate at 
which vulnerability decreases with investment 
in cybersecurity. It can also be seen as a 
measure of investment productivity. It 
measures how efficiently security investment 
is used to reduce the asset vulnerability.  
 
One can also readily see that 𝑣(𝑖) satisfies the 
following three assumptions.  
 Assumption 1.  𝑣(0) = 𝑣0. 
 Assumption 2.  lim
i→∞
𝑣(𝑖) = 0. 







> 0, ∀𝑖.  
Assumption 1 states that if there is no 
investment in security, the vulnerability of the 
system will be the inherent vulnerability. 
Assumption 2 states that no finite investment 
can eradicate the vulnerability from 
information systems. Because of their 
complexity, perfect security is impossible 
(Wu et al., 2015). Assumption 3 states that the 
investment in security reduces the probability 
that the vulnerability may be exploited, but at 
a decreasing rate. Investment makes the 
system more secure, but with declining 
marginal return. 
 
The probability of vulnerability exploitation is 
formulated in Equation 2 as an exponentially 
decreasing function of the security 
investment. Consequently, the probability of a 
successful attack can now be written as 
 
(4) 




This probability depends on the defender 
investment level and the attacker’s effort 
level, in addition to the system’s inherent 
vulnerability.  
 
Defender's loss and attacker's payoff 
In this game the defender seeks to find 
the optimal security investment that 
minimizes the following total cost 
 
(5)     𝑊𝐷 = 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡)𝑙 + 𝑖,     
 
where the first term of its right-hand side is 
the defender’s expected loss due to a 
successful attack. The attacker seeks to 
maximize the following payoff 
 
(6)     𝑊𝐴 = 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡)𝑏 − 𝑡,     
 
where the first term of the right-hand side is 
the attacker’s expected benefit and the second 
term represents the expected effort to 
compromise the system. 
 
Deterrence game’s equilibrium 
This section characterizes the optimal 
solution to the deterrence game. As in the 
standard Stackelberg competition, the game is 
sequential: the defender moves first, 
committing to a strategy before the attacker 
reacts. The defender's strategic choice is to 
select the optimal security investment 
(deterrence by denial). The attacker’s choice 
is to determine his appropriate level of effort. 
The outcome of this leader-follower 
interaction is called Stackelberg equilibrium. 
This equilibrium has been recognized as a 
sound theoretical framework for modeling the 
strategic interactions between attackers and 
defenders (Jain et al., 2010; Korzhyk et al., 
2011; Kiekintveld et al., 2015; Acquaviva, 
2017). 
 
Proposition 1. The following condition is 
satisfied at equilibrium 
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𝑙.    
 
Proof.  Assuming an interior solution, the 
first-order condition (maximizing attacker 
payoff with respect to effort, t) for the 
attacker optimization problem is 
 






𝑏 − 1 = 0.    
 
The optimality condition for the defender 
problem is 
 






𝑙 + 1 = 0.    
 
Equations 8 and 9 lead to the equilibrium 
condition in the Proposition. 
∎ 
Fixing the defender’s security investment to 
some strategy 𝑖, the first problem to be solved 
is to find the attacker’s best response to 𝑖. In 
this optimization problem, the follower 
maximizes his expected benefit given 𝑖. 
 
Proposition 2.  Assuming an interior solution, 
the optimal effort the attacker is willing to 
exert is given by 
 
(10)     𝑡 = −𝛼𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇ln (
𝑏𝑣0
𝜇
)    
 
Proof.  After substitution for 𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡), Equation 
6 becomes  
 
(11) 
𝑊𝐴 = 𝑣0 exp(−𝛼𝑖) (1 − exp (−
𝑡
𝜇
)) 𝑏 − 𝑡.   
 
Computing the derivative of  𝑊𝐴 with respect 
to 𝑡, equating to zero, and solving leads to the 
expression of 𝑡 as a function of 𝑖. 
∎ 
Proposition 3.  The attacker’s level of effort is 
a decreasing function in the defender’s 
investment.  
 
Proof.  The derivative of t with respect to i is 
 
(12)     
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑖
= −𝛼𝜇 < 0.    
  
∎ 
Proposition 4.  Assuming an interior solution, 
the defender optimal security investment level 
is given by 
 
(13)     𝑖 =
1
𝛼
ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0).     
 
Proof.  Equations 4 and 5 imply that 
 
(14) 
𝑊𝐷 = 𝑣0 exp(−𝛼𝑖) (1 − exp (−
𝑡
𝜇
)) 𝑙 + 𝑖.  
 
The expression of 𝑡 in Equation (10) is 
equivalent to  
 






exp(𝛼𝑖).   
 
Substituting for exp (−
𝑡
𝜇
) from Equation 15 
in Equation 14, computing the derivative of 
𝑊𝐷 with respect to 𝑖, equating to zero, and 
solving provides the equilibrium strategy in 
the Proposition. 
∎ 
Proposition 5.  The attacker’s optimal level of 
effort is given by 
 
(16)     𝑡 = 𝜇ln (
𝑏
𝛼𝜇𝑙
).     
 
Proof.  Substituting for 𝑖 from Equation 13 in 
Equation 10 leads to the result. 
∎ 
Proposition 6.  The defender should not 
invest in security beyond best practices until 
the potential loss reaches  
 
(17)     𝑙∗ =
1
𝛼𝑣0
.      
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Proof.  To have a positive investment,    
ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0) > 0. This is possible only if 𝛼𝑙𝑣0 >
1, which leads to the condition in the 
Proposition. 
∎ 
Proposition 7.  The attacker should not exert 
any effort until the potential benefit reaches  
 
(18)     𝑏∗ = 𝛼𝜇𝑙.      
 








which leads to the condition in the 
Proposition.        
          ∎ 
 
Proposition 8.  The defender’s optimal 
security investment level is an increasing 
concave function of the potential loss, 𝑙.  
 
Proof.  As shown in Equations 19 and 20, the 
first derivative of 𝑖 with respect to 𝑙 is 
positive and the second derivative is 
negative, respectively. 
 






> 0.    
 






< 0.    
 
Consequently, 𝑖 is a concave function in 𝑙 that 
increases at decreasing rate. 
∎ 
Proposition 9.  The defender’s optimal 
investment spent on information security as a 
fraction of potential loss 𝑙 is given by 
 






ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0).    
 
Proof.  Dividing the expression of 𝑖 in 
Equation 13 by 𝑙 leads to the result. 
 
Proposition 10.  The fraction 𝑟(𝑙) is an 
increasing function in the potential loss 𝑙 for 






. It is decreasing for 𝑙 ≥
𝑙∗∗ with a horizontal asymptote at 𝑦 = 0. 
 
Proof.  The first derivative of 𝑟(𝑙) with 
respect to 𝑙 is  






(1 − ln(𝛼𝑙𝑣0)).  
 
It is straightforward to show that 
𝑟′(𝑙) = 0 for 𝑙 =
𝑒
𝛼𝑣0








Hence, the potential loss 𝑙 that maximizes the 
fraction 𝑟(𝑙) is given by 
 






.     
 
Using the l’Hopital rule,            
lim𝑙→∞ 𝑟(𝑙) = 0, which shows that 𝑟(𝑙) has a 
horizontal asymptote at 𝑦 = 0. 
∎ 
To deal with uncertainty in the input data, a 
Monte Carlo simulation could represent each 
uncertain parameter as a probability 
distribution. 
 
INVESTMENT IN CYBERSECURITY 
AT EQUILIBRIUM 
 
A parsimonious game-theoretical 
model is used in this paper to characterize 
deterrence in cyberspace. A Stackelberg game 
is played to capture the strategic nature of this 
interaction and provide clear insights about it. 
The suggested mechanism involves disclosing 
the defender’s investment information to the 
potential attacker. The game’s logic and 
results crucially depend on the timings of 
each move. The defender moves first, 
anticipates the strategic behavior of the 
attacker, and decides on the security 
investment. The attacker observes the 
defender’s level of investment and determines 
a certain effort level. By revealing the 
security investment strategy, the defender 
becomes able to control the attacker’s 
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incentive and deter (or reduce the effort 
behind) potential attacks.  
 
Assuming an interior solution, Proposition 1 
characterizes the first-order optimality 
conditions for the defender and attacker 
strategies. It compares, at equilibrium, 
magnitude decline in expected defender loss 
from extra security investment to magnitude 
increase in expected attacker benefit from 
extra effort. Stackelberg interaction joins their 
fates.   
 
At equilibrium, marginal reduction in 
defender’s expected loss due to additional 
investment precisely balances marginal 
increase in the attacker’s expected benefit 
attributable to additional effort.  In order to 
reach this decision point, the attacker as 
follower must be able to measure the 
magnitude of loss to the defender from a 
successful cyber attack. In the Stackelberg 
interaction, attacker does have a clue from 
observing optimal defender security 
investment, which is tied to defender 
assessment of cost in the event of disruption.  
Physical properties of the cyber system’s 
vulnerability must also be common 
knowledge. 
 
Propositions 4 and 5 define the attacker’s 
optimal level of effort and the defender’s 
optimal investment, respectively. Proposition 
4 relates the defender’s strategy to three 
parameters:  
 the inherent vulnerability 𝑣0 
 the decay rate in the vulnerability 
due to investment 𝛼, and 
 the defender’s potential loss 𝑙. 
Proposition 5 shows that the attacker’s 
strategy depends on two other parameters in 
addition to 𝛼 and 𝑙, namely the mean level of 
effort μ (independent of system vulnerability) 
and the attacker potential benefit 𝑏 from 
system disruption.  
 
The derivative of the attacker’s expected 
effort 𝑡 with respect to the defender’s 
investment 𝑖 in Equation 12 indicates that the 
parameters 𝛼 and 𝜇 and their interaction 
effect are the key factors in cyber deterrence, 
that is, in sharply affecting adversaries’ attack 
plans through denial. Equation 12 shows that 
the higher the two parameters the more likely 
the attacker is to be deterred through 
additional defender investment. The 
parameter 𝛼 measures the speed at which 
security investment translates into a reduction 
of the asset’s vulnerability to attacks. An 
increase in the parameter 𝛼 for any given 
level of investment will decrease the 
probability that inherent vulnerability may be 
exploited, lessen the probability of a 
successful attack, and, therefore, result in a 
reduction in the attacker’s level of effort. At 
the same time, the influence of additional 
investment on reducing attacker effort even 
further will rise. Equation 12 also shows that 
opportunistic attacks (with small 𝜇) are harder 
to influence than targeted attacks (with high 
𝜇). Extensive initial interest in the targeted 
system leads potential attackers to be 
discouraged at a steeper rate once they learn 
of additional defender investment.  
 
Propositions 6, 8 and 9 characterize the 
defender’s optimal security investment level 𝑖 
as a function of the potential loss 𝑙. These 
propositions highlight the following key 
findings:  
 The defender should not invest in 
security beyond best practices until the 
potential loss reaches a given value; 
 The optimal security investment 
increases with the expected loss at a 
decreasing rate; 
 The optimal investment in security as 
a fraction of potential loss 𝑙 has a 
horizontal asymptote at 𝑦 = 0. This 
means that, for very large potential 
losses, the optimal amount to spend on 
information security does not keep 
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pace; it is far smaller than the potential 
loss. 
These findings are on par with the deterrence 
literature. They are particularly consistent 
with the study conducted by Gordon and Loeb 
(2002). 
 
The formalism in Equations 4, 5, and 6 is 
grounded theoretically such that the model 
could be repeated or extended using different 
probability distributions. Its underlying 
mathematics is clear and conceptually based. 
Variations of the probability distribution will 
provide qualitatively the same findings. The 
numerical values of these findings will, of 
course, depend on the values of the deterrence 
model parameters. 
 
A myopic approach such as a simultaneous 
game or a decision-theoretic technique would 
produce different results. Under a 
simultaneous game, players make single 
decisions before seeing the other player’s 
moves (as in the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma 
[PD]) and possibly under incomplete 
information about the other player’s payoff 
from certain outcomes. Attackers, for 
example, are not able to observe the outcome 
of previous actions before responding. The 
main characteristic of myopic approaches is 
the non-cooperative, monotonic relationship 
between defender investment level and 
attacker effort. Both players rationally defect 
in PD-type games.  When one cost variable 
increases, the other increases and vice versa; 
net payoffs in equilibrium for both decline. In 
this situation, attackers are never deterred, per 
se, because myopic approaches lack 
disclosure mechanisms. A deeper 
understanding of this interaction will be 




Deterrence is used to prevent 
unwanted actions by influencing the cost-
benefit analysis of potential attackers. The 
most common form of deterrence in 
cyberspace is deterrence by denial. 
Deterrence by denial sends a signal to would-
be attackers that they will be unsuccessful. In 
this defense strategy, the defender reduces the 
probability of a successful attack by investing 
in information security. While the credibility 
of deterrence by punishment depends on 
blame attribution, deterrence by denial does 
not require this knowledge. 
 
This paper used a sequential game theoretic 
approach with a disclosure mechanism 
(Stackelberg competition) to formulate a 
deterrence strategy in cyberspace. It derived 
the defender’s optimal security investment 
level and the attacker’s level of effort. The 
factors influencing the decision to invest in 
cybersecurity were identified and discussed. 
To deal with uncertainty in the input data, the 
model invites parametric analysis using 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
Results for the equilibrium indicate that 
effectiveness of the security investment (𝛼) 
and the category of attack (𝜇) and their 
interaction effect are the key factors in cyber 
deterrence. The more effective the security 
investment in reducing vulnerability and the 
higher attacker initial interest in the target, the 
more likely attacker is to be deterred by 
additional investment. Targeted attacks 
aiming at significant damage to the defender 
are more manageable by security investment 
than opportunistic attacks.  
 
The defender’s optimal security investment 
level (𝑖) as a function of potential loss (𝑙)  
indicates that investment in cybersecurity as a 
deterrence strategy will top out after the 
middle part of losses. At very high levels of 
loss, there is a numbing effect; optimal 
investment does not change much with 
additional increments of loss. 
 
27 Space & Defense  
 
Deterrence in the cyber domain is more 
complex than in the physical field. Further 
efforts should be undertaken to understand it 
in order to influence potential attackers’ 
behaviors. Examples of such studies include 
(but are not limited to)  
 application of the model to a real-
world cyber-security problem using 
real-life parameters, 
 analyzing the interaction between 
defenders and attackers in dynamic 
scenarios, 
 assessing the risk to the defender of a 
disclosure strategy, 
 including deception mechanisms to 
enhance security, 
 developing models to deal with 
bounded rationality of human 
adversaries, 
 combining game theoretic models 
such as this Stackelberg version with 
other techniques and tools to make the 
formalism more realistic and tractable; 
techniques may include numerical 
simulation and genetic algorithms; 
tools may consist of firewalls and anti-
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Technological advances in artificial 
intelligence (AI) by the United States, China 
and Russia jeopardize the longstanding 
nuclear peace that the world has enjoyed since 
the end of the Cold War.1 The desire to obtain 
AI capabilities for the purpose of 
strengthening defense and security postures 
could spur a new arms race among these 
powerful nuclear states, and the United States, 
China, and Russia have all expressed their 
interest in extensive AI research and in the 
implementation of AI in their nuclear 
operations. The application of AI in the 
nuclear operations of a superpower risks 
undermining the world’s relatively stable 
nuclear infrastructure, as AI could essentially 
make a nuclear war “winnable” for the power 
that can harness its benefits first. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, 
the likely asymmetric acquisition of AI-
enhanced technology will introduce a new 
degree of uncertainty as these great-power 
states incorporate it into their nuclear systems. 
As this uncertainty escalates, nuclear crisis 
stability may experience severe adverse 
effects, increasing the chances of a hostile 
nuclear strike. 
 
This study examines the probable impacts of 
the asymmetric acquisition of AI-capabilities 
                                                          
1 Second Lieutenant Marshall Foster (USAFA ’20) is 
pursuing his master’s degree at Georgetown 
University, Washington, D.C. 
on nuclear crises stability by defining relevant 
terms, reviewing relevant existing literature 
and relevant historical cases, forecasting how 
asymmetry will affect stability, and 
formulating a methodology to predict how 
asymmetry may arise in the future.  
 
Ultimately, it concludes that the likely 
forthcoming asymmetry will decrease nuclear 
crisis stability. In response, the United States 
and the international community should 
engage in methods to limit the likelihood of 
great-power states seizing advantages that AI 
may provide for their nuclear capabilities. 
These methods include pushing for 
transparency, intelligence gathering, and arms 
control. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
RELEVANT DEFINITIONS 
 
Future Impacts of AI 
Michael Horowitz’s analysis of 
possible first-mover advantages following AI 
development has set the stage for research in 
this field. Horowitz aims to answer the 
question, “What will advances in artificial 
intelligence mean for international 
competition and the balance of power?” 
(Horowitz, 2018: 37). He evaluates how 
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developing AI capabilities will influence 
military power and international relations 
while stressing that AI is more than a 
technology within itself. Rather, AI is an 
enabler like electricity or a combustion 
engine. Answering his original question, 
Horowitz provides two possible answers.  
 
First, “key drivers of AI development in the 
private sector could cause the rapid diffusion 
of military applications of AI, limiting first-
mover advantages for innovators” (Ibid.: 37). 
On the other hand, Horowitz recognizes that 
the application of AI to military uses may be 
more difficult than many expect and therefore 
may provide substantial first-mover 
advantages for global powers. When 
comparing these two possibilities, he asserts 
that diffusion of AI would lower the 
likelihood of a first-mover advantage, but 
military AI may be more “excludable” than 
civilian uses of AI and may generate more 
first-mover advantages.  
 
Since there is high-cost, up-front research and 
development for acquiring AI systems that 
will enable rapid power projection, Horowitz 
tends to believe that AI will indeed produce 
significant first-mover military advantages 
despite private sector diffusions. He states 
that the integration of AI into early-warning 
systems and its ability to aid in rapid targeting 
could also affect crisis stability and nuclear 
weapons, but he conspicuously does not 
elaborate on the topic. Recognizing these 
advantages helps predict outcomes when 
comparing the asymmetrical abilities of 
competing states.  
 
Elaborating on the ideas that Horowitz 
presented, Elsa Kania believes that AI 
“should be recognized as a strategic 
technology with implications for national 
competitiveness that extend well beyond the 
military domain” (Kania, 2018: 11). States 
may apply it to a wide range of objectives, 
including military, economic, and educational 
programing. As a policy response, Kania 
suggests that great-power states seek 
opportunities to cooperate on AI issues and to 
prevent escalation of AI warfare. For 
instance, the United Nations Group of 
Governmental Experts provides one means of 
accomplishing this goal. The working group 
brings together over twenty states to engage 
in conversations regarding state behavior in 
cyberspace as it enables “vital discussions of 
core concepts and questions, particularly 
ethical issues and human control, and 
hopefully can create a critical foundation for 
future engagement” (Kania, 2018: 18).  
 
Separately from the intersection of the two 
technologies, Kania provides an analogy 
between the rise of AI and that of nuclear 
weapons. The advent of nuclear weapons 
posed a similar threat to strategic stability, 
and during the height of the Cold War and 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
nuclear weapons states discussed shared 
concerns and aversions. Kania believes that 
similar cooperation and discussion regarding 
pragmatic measures aimed at risk reduction 
will be equally beneficial. However, due to 
the ambiguity concerning formalized 
definitions of AI and the wide range of AI 
capabilities, cooperation in this realm may be 
even more difficult than that for nuclear 
weapons, and this will require a greater 
degree of transparency regarding intent and 
capabilities. 
 
Adding to the conversation, James Johnson 
discusses the deterministic and dramatic 
potential effects, from the tactical to the 
strategic level, that AI will have on military 
power, strategy, and the global balance. He 
argues that if “left unchecked, the 
uncertainties and vulnerabilities created by 
the rapid proliferation and diffusion of AI 
could become a major potential source of 
instability and great power strategic rivalry” 
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(Johnson, 2019: 148). This is similar to 
Horowitz’s thesis, but Johnson focuses on 
managing escalation and unique risks of AI 
rather than first-mover advantages.  
 
Specifically related to nuclear deterrence, 
Johnson discusses the integration of AI into 
early-warning systems. This application may 
accelerate the decision-making process and 
the stages of the escalation ladder to employ a 
nuclear attack. In addition, “a state could 
deploy long-range, offensive conventional 
missile salvos enhanced by big data analytics, 
cyber capabilities, and AI-augmented 
autonomous weapons, and then use its missile 
defenses to mop-up an adversary’s remaining 
retaliatory capabilities” (Ibid.: 152).  
 
Both of these scenarios could have a negative 
impact on nuclear crisis stability as they 
provide conditions that could offer advantages 
for a state to strike first against an adversary.  
Furthermore, Johnson holds that states may 
soon develop AI-augmented weapons 
systems. These systems, along with AI-
enabled early-warning systems and sensors, 
“could adversely impact the international 
security and, potentially, crisis stability at a 
nuclear level of warfare” (Ibid.: 159).  
 
Finally, utilizing scenarios regarding 
aggression between Russia and NATO, 
Michael O’Hanlon (2018) illustrates how AI 
will alter the future of warfare. He discusses 
the potential for escalation following possible 
Russian attacks on the Baltic States, which 
ranges from minimal ground conflicts to 
nuclear warfare. While O’Hanlon believes 
there are appropriate measures in place, 
coming from both NATO and Russian 
deterrence policies, that will prevent 
escalation to war on a nuclear level, the 
introduction of AI could seriously damage 
this crisis stability. According to O’Hanlon, 
there is currently a relative balance of tactical 
[sic] capabilities between nuclear weapons 
states. One country might improve its missile 
defense capabilities, but an adversary might 
produce a new nuclear missile with improved 
agility and speed.  
 
This present balance upholds stability 
between states, as there cannot likely be a 
clear winner in a nuclear exchange. 
Unfortunately, as O’Hanlon argues, the 
application of AI to military systems 
undermines this stability for a number of 
reasons. First, “it seems implausible that arms 
control agreements [regarding AI] would 
prevent the development and deployment 
of… autonomous systems” (O’Hanlon, 2018: 
8). States would feel powerful incentives to 
produce autonomous systems because the 
mere possibility of another state 
accomplishing this feat first would place the 
first at a severe disadvantage.  
 
Second, at present, there is no clear response 
to an attack made with AI. This dilemma 
mirrors the cyber realm since an attack that 
utilizes AI or cyber can come in many 
different forms and degrees of severity, 
rendering it difficult for a state to formulate a 
response that is appropriate and that does not 
escalate the conflict. Finally, “the degree of 
difficulty [of winning a war with AI] would 
be quite considerable and the degree of 
escalatory risk highly unsettling” (Ibid.: 21). 
Again, like cyber warfare, AI introduces a 
high level of ambiguity to conflict since it is 
not clear what an AI attack will look like or 
the form it will take.  
 
Stephen Cimbala (2012) presents an argument 
that is in line with O’Hanlon’s. Cimbala holds 
that the uncertainty that AI will bring to the 
battlefield will undermine stability. Overall, 
O’Hanlon’s various scenarios revolving 
around the implementation of AI into military 
systems effectively demonstrate how AI will 
affect conflict at the tactical level and how 
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these tactical repercussions alter strategic 
stability.  
 
The Likely Asymmetric Acquisition of 
Capabilities 
In addition to projecting the impacts 
of AI, Kania (2018) provides analysis on how 
the U.S., China, and Russia have embarked on 
an AI arms race. There is ongoing military 
competition between these states as they 
attempt to advance their AI capabilities, and 
the United States is arguably but likely the 
current leader. However, China is prioritizing 
military innovation and actively seeking a 
wide range of defense applications of AI, 
placing them as a close second to the United 
States in this competition. Additionally, 
Russia’s pursuits in the same realm are 
advancing at a rapid pace. Kania’s underlying 
argument lies in the idea that the term “arms 
race” is too simplistic to capture the strategic 
consequences of the AI revolution.  
 
Supporting this claim and building upon 
Horowitz, Kania states that AI is not a 
weapon in itself. Rather, AI is a utility that 
states can utilize to enhance their existing 
military capabilities. In this sense, AI is more 
synonymous with electricity or the steam 
engine than a specific weapons system since it 
is only useful due to its applications. States 
cannot launch AI at another state, but they can 
employ autonomous planes, self-guided 
nuclear missiles, or various other weapons 
systems with AI.  
 
Like Kania, Adrian Pecotic (2019) addresses 
the apparent race for AI between the United 
States, Russia, and China. However, instead 
of calling for global cooperation and dialogue 
as Kania did, Pecotic focuses on different 
approaches to AI implementation and claims 
that whichever state successfully incorporates 
AI into their military systems will secure 
significant military advantages. He admits 
that “it’s tough to tell what sort of advantage 
is at stake, because we don’t know what sort 
of thing AI will turn out to be” (Pecotic, 
2019: 3). Nonetheless, there will be 
advantages following the acquisition of AI 
capabilities, and they may take the form of 
autonomous drones, more efficient supply 
changes, or autonomous nuclear missiles.  
 
Additionally, just as Kania predicted, Pecotic 
believes that advances in AI may resemble the 
nuclear weapons buildup of the Cold War. He 
suggests that the main competition will be 
between the United States and China and does 
not have the same solution for the situation as 
Kania provided. Pecotic holds that “once 
China or the United States is confident in a 
stable lead [in AI], they will have few 
incentives to compromise or share 
technology” (Ibid.: 22). 
 
Defining Crisis Stability 
A significant number of scholars and 
practitioners have spent time defining crisis 
stability. This study will focus on the 
definition presented by Thomas Schelling, 
which has prevailed throughout the evolution 
of nuclear deterrence literature. As Schelling 
famously stated, “the reciprocal fear of 
surprise attack” may drive states to launch a 
presumptive strike. In this case, “fear that the 
other may be about to strike in the mistaken 
belief that [one side is] about to strike gives 
[this side] a motive for striking, and so 
justifies the other’s motive” (Schelling, 1958: 
1).  
 
This scenario describes the essence of crisis 
stability, which exists when neither side feels 
the pressure to strike the other out of fear that 
the other is about to strike. Furthermore, the 
acquisition of new offensive capabilities 
threatens crisis stability. As Robert Jervis 
describes, under circumstances in which a 
state fears an adversarial attack, “the state's 
efforts to deter the adversary or protect itself 
in case of war would make war more likely. 
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Observing the state's preparations, the 
adversary would see the danger of war 
increasing and would itself make ready to 
strike” (Jervis, 1993: 242). 
 
The introduction of AI into nuclear systems 
may create the circumstances Jervis describes. 
As the literature from Horowitz, Kania, and 
others has demonstrated, AI is a technology 
enhancer that possesses unknown potential 
and is clouded with uncertainty. It will be 
very difficult for states to predict how others 
will utilize AI, how they will rely on AI, and 
how they will program their automated 
machines. Altogether, AI will introduce many 
unknowns in a state’s calculations when 
predicting an adversarial attack. This 
uncertainty may create situations in which 
crisis stability diminishes.  
 
As Glenn Kent and David Thaler describe, 
crisis instability is the “condition that exists 
when either leader feels pressure because of 
emotion, uncertainty, miscalculation, 
misperception, or the posture of forces to 
strike first to avoid the worse consequence of 
incurring a first strike” (Kent and Thaler, 
1989: xviii). Therefore, the uncertainty and 
probability of miscalculation that comes with 
the introduction of AI to nuclear systems 
would likely increase crisis instability 
between states. 
 
HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
 
Three specific historical cases can 
help predict the effects of the onset of AI in 
nuclear weapons systems. These cases reflect 
the introduction of new technologies and 
strategies that risked nuclear escalation but in 
which great power states managed to prevent 
conflict. The lessons learned from each case 
will be useful in formulating predictions, but 
it is important to note that AI will bring 
extreme uncertainty that previous changes in 
nuclear deterrence have not. 
First, the Soviet acquisition of ICBMs during 
the Cold War and the ensuing American 
“window of vulnerability” mirror the possible 
advent of AI in nuclear weapons systems. 
According to Cold War deterrence scholars 
Richard Lebow and Janice Stein, “By the end 
of the 1960s, the Soviet Strategic Rocket 
Forces had deployed enough ICBMs to 
destroy about half of the population and 
industry of the United States. It had achieved 
the capability that McNamara considered 
essential for MAD [mutually assured 
destruction]. Sometime in the 1970s the 
Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity” 
(Lebow and Stein, 1995: 173).  
 
In response, the United States pursued a path 
to build up their stockpile of ICBMs and 
embark in counterforce doctrine (Johnson, 
1983). This period marked uncertainty for the 
United States, just as the implementation of 
AI will do for any adversary. However, the 
Soviet advantage did not drive the United 
States to attack the Soviet Union or develop a 
new technology that would counteract the 
ICBMs, which would be in line with the 
hypothesis of this study. Instead, the United 
States embarked on a new strategy and aimed 
to reinstate a balance of power. Nonetheless, 
AI will introduce a level of uncertainty that 
ICBMs did not, meaning the two technologies 
may not create similar environments 
following their introduction to a state’s 
nuclear weapons complex. 
 
Secondly, President Reagan’s counterforce 
strategies along with the American advantage 
in surveillance techniques during the Cold 
War provide another case study to help 
predict the effects of AI on deterrence. 
Counterforce strategies offer a unique 
asymmetry between adversaries, as “one 
effect of counterforce strategies… is that they 
provide a rational motive for waging a 
conventional war even when one expects to 
lose” (Wagner, 1991: 748). At the same time, 
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according to Austin Long and Brendan 
Rittenhouse Green (2014), the United States 
had a significant advantage over the Soviet 
Union in the realm of intelligence and 
surveillance regarding nuclear weapons. This 
came in the forms of ocean surveillance 
technology for submarines, SIGINT, and 
Rapidly Deployable Surveillance System 
units. Altogether, these American advantages 
along with U.S. counterforce strategy 
demonstrate a path that adversaries may 
pursue in order to maximize the costs of 
waging war against them.  
 
As Wagner (1991) described, counterforce is 
useful even when a state is losing, so it is a 
useful deterrent against an adversary. This 
case represents how adversaries may react if 
another acquires AI capabilities. Rather than 
purely pursuing the same route as an 
adversary, another may alter their strategy or 
develop a technology that helps counter 
others. 
 
Finally, veering away from nuclear 
deterrence, the American and Chinese 
acquisition of space capabilities surrounding 
the turn of the century offers another 
comparison to the future mutual acquisition of 
AI capabilities. Following China’s milestone 
as it became the third country to launch a 
person into space in 2003, the United States 
had a clear choice to make: “America could 
reach out to cooperate, proposing joint space 
exploration projects, or it could restrict 
collaboration and perhaps even decide to 
pursue a space race akin to the 1960s 
competition against the Soviet Union” 
(Moskowitz, 2011).  
 
Out of fear, the United States resisted 
cooperation. It believed that collaboration 
would provide a greater technological benefit 
to China and would create a large risk for the 
United States. However, Clara Moskowitz 
(2011) recommends that the United States 
should view space as only one aspect in the 
overall U.S.-China relationship. Instead of 
comparing advantages solely in the context of 
space, Americans should see collaboration as 
a way to strengthen ties, increase cooperation 
in other fields, and maintain stability between 
the two countries.  
 
Similar to the previous case studies, the 
Chinese acquisition of space capabilities did 
not lead to acts of aggression. Altogether, the 
three cases do not point to the likelihood of 
AI leading to a breaking point in crisis 
stability between the United States and China 
or the United States and Russia. However, as 
the rest of this study will conclude, AI will 
introduce more technological and strategic 
uncertainty than past technologies.  
 
When the Soviet Union developed ICBMs or 
the Chinese put a person in space, the United 
States understood the technology, but an 
ICBM or another feat that the United States 
had previously accomplished is significantly 
easier to evaluate than AI capabilities. Rather, 
AI may appear in a variety of realms as it is 
not a technology within itself, like Horowitz 
and Kania remind us. AI is an enabler that 
will introduce indefinite amounts of 
uncertainty between adversaries and become 
far more dangerous to crisis stability than the 




In order to predict the impact of 
asymmetric acquisition of AI capabilities 
through a systematic method, this paper will 
utilize a series of tables that register possible 
advantages within the varying uses of AI in 
nuclear systems for different states. Rather 
than simply recognizing that there may be 
qualitative variances regarding how states 
implement AI, this method illustrates the 
degree to which different capabilities will 
impact crisis stability. Although there are a 
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variety of techniques for which a state may 
incorporate AI into its numerous nuclear 
systems, this system of operationalization will 
focus on five primary, general, and likely uses 
of AI: (1) unmanned nuclear delivery 
systems, (2) nuclear early warning systems, 
(3) command and control, (4) data processing, 
and (5) nuclear weapons countermeasures. 
This is not to say that there are no other 
possible applications of AI for nuclear 
systems, simply that these capabilities provide 
areas in which major-power states may 
acquire distinct advantages. The methodology 
will utilize the five categories as examples for 
how acquisition of varying proficiencies 
produces asymmetry and ultimately harms 
nuclear crisis stability. 
 
In order to compare capabilities between two 
states, it is beneficial to focus on a state’s 
advantage through AI-enhancement and its 
reliance upon AI for each category. Simply 
prioritizing the possession of an AI-enhanced 
capability neglects the asymmetry that may 
arise from variances in how states utilize AI-
systems. For example, if a state utilizes AI to 
assist its early warning systems while another 
relies on AI in its early warning systems to 
make final decisions (without a human in the 
loop), the latter has a much stronger reliance 
upon AI. Similarly, if both states possess AI-
enhanced nuclear weapons countermeasures, 
one may possess an extremely reliable system 
while the other’s system may be faulty or 
incomplete. In this case, one state has a 
distinctive advantage over the other regarding 
countermeasures. Therefore, some 
consideration of reliance and consequent 
advantage provides a better reference for 
measuring asymmetry than pure possession of 
the technology. 
 
When addressing the total degree of 
asymmetry that varying capabilities produce, 
it is important to note that some capabilities 
have greater weight than others. For instance, 
the utilization of AI-enhanced unmanned 
delivery vehicles may worry an adversary 
more than the possession of AI-enhanced data 
processing systems. Consequently, when 
measuring asymmetry, or perceived 
asymmetry, it is useful to weigh delivery 
vehicles as providing greater advantage than 
data processing abilities. 
 
In order to combine these factors, the 
presence of advantages and their respective 
weights, Table 1, below, presents a method of 
predicting asymmetry between states. In this 
table, the advantages of both states regarding 
varying capabilities are registered for each 
category, with “1” representing an advantage 
while “0” represents the lack thereof. If both 
states record a “0,” then neither state holds a 
distinct advantage over the other in the 
respective category. The numbers recorded as 
“weights of capability” represent the impact 
that the presence of an advantage in the 
specific category will have on the total 
asymmetry in the overall relationship. Finally, 
if there is a presence of an advantage, that 
category will produce a score of asymmetry 
equal to its assigned weight. The overall table 
output will be the sum of each capability’s 
recorded score of asymmetry. 
 
As opposed to presenting an argument for 
which state will possess future advantage in 
each category and how each category should 
be weighted exactly, this study merely 
proposes predictions for the purpose of 
demonstrating the likely increases in 
asymmetry. These guesses show how 
acquisitions of varying capabilities may 
populate this table following how states 
incorporate AI into their nuclear weapons 
systems. In this sense, Tables 2-3, below, 
demonstrate a methodology or tool for 
predicting asymmetry. Using placeholder 
values for how the United States, China, and 
Russia will acquire AI, the tables indicate 
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possible asymmetry that may arise between 
these major-power states.  
 
The hypothetical relationship between the 
United States and Russia (in Table 3) scored a 
7 while that of the United States and China (in 
Table 2) scored an 8. When compared next to 
each other, these values do not have any 
significance because neither the category 
advantages nor the weights are tied to a 
consistent interval level of measurement. The 
fact that China’s score is higher than Russia’s 
does not mean that there is more asymmetry 
in that relationship.  
 
Rather, these values have significance when 
compared to other values from the same 
tables when the inputs change. That is, 
longitudinal changes (over time) in table 
output are more meaningful than cross-dyad 
differences in any single year. The various 
possible inputs (advantages in capabilities 
along with the weights) in a specific table 
dictate the overall table output.  
 
When the U.S.-China analysis produces a 
score of 8, the policy takeaway should focus 
on methods to reduce the table output over 
time, which could occur from the removal of 
or the emergence of new advantages. A 
scenario that produces higher table outputs for 
the same dyad indicates higher levels of 
asymmetry. The desire to decrease asymmetry 
would entail efforts to minimize the table 
outputs so that they approach zero in every 
category of capability.  
 
Consequences 
As this method of predicting 
asymmetry between the selected major-power 
states demonstrates, qualitative variance in 
acquiring AI-enhanced nuclear weapons will 
increase asymmetry within these 
relationships. This asymmetry will 
undoubtedly increase the uncertainty of these 
states when analyzing the capabilities of an 
adversary due to the fact that AI is a format of 
technology, a kind of utility that contains a 
wide array of unknown variables. A state may 
be uncertain of how an adversary’s AI 
systems function, the degree to which they 
rely on AI in these systems, the decision-
making autonomy given to the system, etc.  
 
Referring to Kent and Thaler’s definition of 
nuclear crisis stability, that “crisis instability 
is the condition that exists when either leader 
feels pressure because of emotion, 
uncertainty, miscalculation, misperception, or 
the posture of forces to strike first to avoid the 
worse consequence of incurring a first strike,” 
this increase of uncertainty from AI 
asymmetry will negatively affect nuclear 
crisis stability. It follows that as asymmetry 
increases (or the table outputs presented 
increase,) the degree of uncertainty will 




After reviewing the case studies 
presented in this study, it may not seem as if 
asymmetry truly effects crisis stability to the 
point that an actor will utilize a preemptive 
strike. In the historical cases of Soviet 
acquisition of ICBM’s, the American 
employment of counterforce strategies, and 
the Chinese rise in space power, no state 
chose to strike its adversary. These results 
would lead to the conclusion that asymmetric 
acquisition of capabilities does not 
significantly diminish nuclear crisis stability. 
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, great 
powers have always found a way to avoid 
worst case scenarios that might be brought 
about from rapid technological change. 
 
However, AI provides more uncertainty 
regarding intention and capabilities than the 
technologies presented in the old case studies. 
For example, when the Soviet Union acquired 
ICBMs, the United States recognized what 
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this meant for their security posture. It was 
clear what advantage this weapon system 
provided the Soviets, so the level of 
uncertainty was relatively low.  
 
In the case of AI, as previously mentioned, 
states will struggle to determine how states 
will be able to utilize autonomous systems. 
Intentions, capabilities, and reliance will all 
be indeterminate without transparency from 
great power states that acquire AI. For this 
reason, AI introduces a new level of 
uncertainty regarding capabilities that is 
unprecedented and may have unique effects 
on nuclear crisis stability. More specifically, 
the uncertainty surrounding AI-enhanced 
systems will decrease nuclear crisis stability 
in a way that previously existing technologies 
have not. 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
To reiterate, the method presented in 
this study demonstrates how crisis stability 
will decrease as great-power states 
asymmetrically acquire AI-enhanced 
technologies and incorporate them—in 
qualitatively different ways—into their 
nuclear weapons systems. For policy, this 
introduces the desire to limit asymmetry 
between major-power states.  
 
In order for the United States to achieve this 
goal and preserve nuclear crisis stability, it 
could pursue three distinct actions. First, it 
might enhance its intelligence gathering 
methods that allow it to better understand 
adversaries’ intentions and capabilities 
regarding AI-enhanced systems. By doing so, 
the United States will increase its ability to 
accurately predict AI paths of its adversaries. 
The United States should then aim to limit 
asymmetry between itself and adversaries by 
increasing its own capabilities in the same 
areas as adversaries. Using strengthened 
intelligence from the first step would allow 
the United States to know which capabilities 
its adversaries are developing, and increase its 
ability to counter, to stay on par with those 
adversaries.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, the United 
States and the international community could 
work to place controls and regulations on the 
incorporation of AI in nuclear weapons 
systems in a bid to maintain transparency. 
This final step would decrease the number of 
areas in which states could develop AI-
systems and therefore reduce the chances that 
a state might achieve an advantage over the 
United States. Altogether, these prudent steps 
would limit asymmetry between major-power 
states, prevent uncertainty regarding 
adversarial AI-enhanced nuclear systems, and 
ultimately help maintain nuclear crisis 
stability. 
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Since the end of the Second World 
War the United States has practiced extended 
deterrence as a means of resisting Russian 
expansion and aggression.1 In Europe, the US 
has done this with the support of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. After the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, NATO shifted its focus away from 
Russia and grew to include several states 
which had once been part of the USSR; 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. However, it 
was not until after conflict broke out in 
Ukraine in 2014, and Russia re-emerged as a 
threat that the alliance was forced to seriously 
consider defending the Baltics.  
 
For several years, NATO has concentrated its 
efforts almost exclusively on the structure and 
placement of military forces with hopes of re-
building its once-strong deterrence posture in 
Europe. The modern, non-kinetic threat to the 
Baltic Three, however, demands more 
nuanced solutions which transcend the 
military sphere. For this reason, the United 
States and its NATO allies must focus more 
of their efforts in Northeastern Europe on 
resilience rather than traditional deterrence. A 
strategy of resilience in the Baltics must 
include efforts to counter propaganda and 
                                                          
1 Second Lieutenant Liam Connolly (USAFA ’19) is 
completing his pilot training. 
2 Schuyler Foerster, ed., American Defense Policy, 6th 
edition. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1990). 
 
information warfare, build societal cohesion 
and assimilate Russian-speaking people, and 
reinforce cyber security in both the private 
and public sectors. Altogether, these lines of 
effort will deny the Kremlin the ability to 
achieve political and strategic goals in the 
Baltics. 
 
EXTENDED DETERRENCE VERSUS 
RESILIENCE 
 
Extended deterrence is the concept in 
which one state guarantees that it will use its 
military forces not only for its own defense, 
but also for the defense of its allies. This is 
done with the intent to persuade a third-party 
mutual adversary to maintain the status quo in 
a conflict.2 Regardless of the domain, 
deterrence, at its core, consists of two 
elements: capabilities and credibility. 
Deterrence is only functional when these 
elements come together and capabilities are 
matched with an actual willingness to employ 
such capabilities.  
 
Signaling “will” is critical when it comes to 
proving the resolve and legitimacy of an 
alliance which includes an extended 
deterrence agreement.3 The United States has 
3 Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser, “Signaling 
Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in 
Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of 
Political Science 58, no. 4 (October 2014): 919–935. 
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long struggled with figuring out how exactly 
to signal to adversaries its true willingness to 
employ military forces and risk personal 
harm, or even survival, for the sake of another 
state’s security. Signals which are too strong 
run the risk of escalating the conflict to a 
point which is too costly for either side.  
 
This was the case in October 1969 when 
President Richard Nixon ordered the 
“Madman Nuclear Alert” and heightened the 
readiness of US strategic forces in hopes of 
bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table in 
Vietnam.4 Soviet leadership, however, was 
unsure how to interpret the message and 
experts conclude that the alert represented a 
serious miscalculation on behalf of US 
leadership and was ultimately detrimental to 
stability.5  
 
On the other hand, weaker signals may 
embolden the adversary. In his landmark 
work, Arms and Influence, political scientist 
Thomas Schelling explained the dangers 
associated with allowing an adversary to 
slowly push the limits of a security 
commitment with tactics that meet, but do not 
cross, the threshold for retaliation. 
Schelling coined the term “salami tactics” to 
describe such activities and argued that, over 
time, the threshold for retaliation will be 
forced to rise and the adversary will earn 
greater freedom to exercise its will.6 
 
In the nuclear domain, extended deterrence 
works to prevent nuclear-capable adversaries 
from striking allies and partners who lack 
                                                          
4 Scott Sagan and Jeremi Suri, “The Madman Nuclear 
Alert,” The MIT Press 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 150–
183. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Thomas C. Schelling, “The Art of Commitment,” in 
Arms and Influence (New haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966). 
7 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1983). 
such capabilities. Nuclear deterrence is 
closely linked with punishment, or the threat 
of using strategic weapons to eliminate 
significant portions of an adversary’s civilian 
population and infrastructure.7  
 
Extended nuclear deterrence also works as a 
means of preventing the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. States have no need to 
pursue their own nuclear program if they feel 
assured by an ally’s capabilities. For decades, 
the United States’ nuclear umbrella has 
applied to each of its NATO allies and has 
expanded as the alliance has stretched 
eastward towards Russia. NATO’s 2010 
Strategic Concept explicitly states that, “[t]he 
supreme guarantee of the security of the 
Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear 
forces of the Alliance, particularly those of 
the United States.”8 Simply put, the United 
States’ nuclear capabilities stand as the 
bedrock of NATO members’ national 
security.  
 
Much like nuclear capabilities, conventional 
forces also play an essential role in efforts to 
deter an adversary. Conventional deterrence, 
however, tends to be more closely associated 
with denial, or simply, “convincing an 
opponent that he will not attain his goals on 
the battlefield.”9 Today, NATO members 
contribute troops and resources to 
conventional land, air, and sea forces, some of 
which are forward staged on the alliance’s 
eastern flank.10 Given NATO’s strictly 
defensive posture, these forces and their 
capabilities are meant to influence Russian 
8 NATO, “Strategic Concept for the Defence and 
Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization” (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 
November 20, 2010). 
9 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence. 
10 David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing 
Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank (RAND 
Corporation, 2016). 
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leaders’ calculus should they consider hostile 
military intervention within the borders of the 
alliance. 
 
In the 21st Century, extended deterrence is 
not strictly limited to the conventional and 
nuclear domains. A truly effective modern 
deterrence posture incorporates the full 
spectrum of warfighting domains to make 
clear to the adversary that any act of 
aggression would prove to be too costly in the 
long term. US Air Force General John E. 
Hyten, the current Commander of 
USSTRATCOM, underscored the reality of 
this dynamic when he said the following: 
 
The components of our nuclear triad 
have always been and will continue to 
be the backbone of our nation’s 
deterrent force. That is where 
deterrence starts. But today it’s more 
than just nuclear. It requires the 
integration of all our capabilities…11 
 
Deterrence theory was largely born out of the 
Cold War’s bi-polar balance of power which 
rested on the strength of conventional and 
nuclear forces, but the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union has forced a dramatic shift in 
the global security environment. Adversaries 
have rapidly worked to gain an asymmetric 
edge given the United States’ and its allies’ 
sizeable conventional advantage.12 
 
In turn, warfighting domains which exist 
beyond the conventional and nuclear spheres 
have become increasingly relevant in recent 
years. Most notably, states and non-state 
actors alike have begun working to exploit the 
                                                          
11 General John E. Hyten, “2017 Deterrence 
Symposium Opening Remarks” (Omaha, Nebraska, 
July 26, 2017). 
12 Herbert Lin and Jackie Kerr, “On Cyber-Enabled 
Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation,” 
SSRN (August 13, 2017). 
harmful, even militant potential of space and 
cyberspace. Beyond that, some countries, 
namely Russia, have incorporated “soft”, 
traditionally non-military tools into military 
doctrine for achieving political and strategic 
goals.13 Rather than existing in separate 
spheres, economic, diplomatic, and 
informational tactics are now central to 
modern warfare. This full spectrum approach 
to conflict poses a challenge to traditional 
deterrence theory as leaders today are forced 
to consider how to address threats and acts of 
aggression which do not meet the threshold 
for a violent, military response. 
 
Relative to extended deterrence and 
traditional methods of maintaining the status 
quo, resilience offers a more nuanced 
approach to meeting these modern security 
challenges. As explained by Dr. Guillaume 
Lasconjarias of the NATO Defense College, 
deterrence focuses primarily on the military 
sphere, whereas a strategy of resilience takes 
a “whole-of-society approach” to reducing a 
nation’s vulnerability to 21st Century threats 
such as information warfare and cyber-
attacks.14 
 
Rather than preventing attacks before they 
take place, resilience ensures that the acts of 
aggression are unable to achieve the effects 
desired by the adversary. As members of the 
transatlantic political community, NATO 
member states pride themselves on fostering 
free and open societies. Unfortunately, this 
makes the world’s most robust military 
13 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and 
Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, 
February 27, 2013. 
14 Guillaume Lasconjarias, Deterrence through 
Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of 
Being Prepared, Eisenhower Papers (Rome: Research 
Division - NATO Defense College, May 2017). 
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alliance exceptionally weak with regards to 
these threats.15 
 
In practice, resilience includes a wide array of 
potential endeavors, which range from 
improving education, building societal 
cohesion, and strengthening law enforcement 
among other things.16 Because the focus is 
internal, each state’s approach to resilience is 
likely to be unique. However, regardless of the 
means taken to achieve it, the ultimate goal is to 
enhance a nation’s capacity to withstand 
prolonged pressure and aggression. To be clear, 
resilience is not a complete alternative to 
deterrence but rather a means of reinforcing and 
supplementing deterrence. Given the challenges 
and threats currently facing NATO in the Baltics, 
it is worthwhile to consider a shift in focus 
from deterrence to resilience in this specific 
corner of the alliance. 
 
THE THREAT TO THE BALTIC THREE 
 
In 2004 Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
were welcomed into NATO as full members, 
and thus became beneficiaries of the 
alliance’s collective defense agreement.17 
Likewise, the former Soviet republics also 
took their place under the shield of the US 
nuclear umbrella.  
The Baltic States represent the eastern-most 
edge of the alliance and the farthest that 
NATO has reached into the Russian sphere of 
influence.  
 
The Baltics’ relationship with Russia dates 
back to the 18th century and the times when 
                                                          
15 Franklin Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, and Dan 
Hamilton, “Defend the Arteries of Society,” US New & 
World Report, June 9, 2015, sec. World Report. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in 
the 21st Century (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2016). 
18 Romuald J. Misiunas and James H. Bater, “Baltic 
States - Independence and the 20th Century,” 
Encyclopedia Britannica. 
19 Ibid. 
the Russian Empire ruled what is now 
modern-day Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.18 
The Russian Revolution granted the Baltics a 
brief period of independence, but Soviet 
occupation took hold in 1940 as Europe 
nosedived towards the Second World War.19 
Across the Soviet era, the Baltic States stood 
as part of the geographic “buffer” between 
Russia and the West. 
 
Following WWII, the communist regime in 
Moscow implemented so-called Russification 
policies across the USSR in hopes of, 
“sovietizing the non-Russian population.”20 
Ethnic Russians proliferated throughout the 
Soviet republics and along with them came 
Russian language and culture.21 As a result, 
over the course of fifty years of Soviet 
occupation the ethnic composition of the 
Baltic States was dramatically altered.  
 
Today, in Lithuania, 5.8% of the overall 
population is ethnically Russian while 8% 
speak Russian as their primary language.22 In 
comparison, 24.8% of Estonians are 
ethnically Russian and 29.6% speak Russian 
as their primary language.23 In Latvia, the 
state most severely impacted by Russification 
in the Baltics, 25.6% of the population is 
ethnically Russian while 33% of citizens 
identify Russian as their primary language.24  
 
In 2014 the Putin regime asserted that Russia 
has an obligation to “protect” ethnic Russians 
20 Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in 
Russia and the USSR, Princteon Legacy Library 
(Princeton University Press, 1994). 
21 Ibid. 
22 “The World Factbook: Lithuania,” Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
23 “The World Factbook: Estonia,” Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
24 “The World Factbook: Latvia,” Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
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and Russian-speaking people everywhere.25 
Russia, in turn, relied on this claim to justify 
the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula as 
well as their support for the bloody separatist 
movement in Eastern Ukraine.26 Coupled with 
the history of the Baltics’ relationship with 
Russia, this policy strongly implies that 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are logical 
targets of Russian belligerence. 
 
Already, the Baltic States have found 
themselves victims of low-level, non-violent 
Russian aggression.27 In 2007, cyber 
infrastructure in Estonia was struck with 
massive “distributed denial of service” 
(DDOS) attacks after the Estonian 
government decided to move a Soviet war 
memorial outside the center of the country’s 
capital city, Tallinn.28 Although there has 
been no definitive proof that the attacks were 
ordered or carried out about by the Russian 
government, Estonian investigators claim to 
have traced the attacks back to internet users 
in Russia.  
 
Likewise, Lithuania claims that between 2015 
and 2016 the Kremlin was responsible for a 
wave of cyber-attacks against government 
systems.29 More recently, in August of 2017 
the Kurzeme region of Latvia experienced a 
widespread cell-service outage. A Russian 
ship equipped with electronic warfare 
capabilities was coincidentally located off 
Latvia’s coast at the time of the outage, and 
                                                          
25 “Transcript: Putin Says Russia Will Protect the 
Rights of Russians Abroad,” The Washington Post, 
March 18, 2014, sec. World. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Andrew Radin, “Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: 
Threats and Potential Responses” (RAND 
Corportation, 2017).  
28 Will Goodman, “Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in 
Theory than in Practice?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 4, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 102-135. 
29 Andrius Sytas, “Russian Hacking Threatens 
Lithuania’s Banks: Survey,” Reuters, June 6, 2017. 
the country’s intelligence services strongly 
suspected a connection.30 These alleged 
attacks are consistent with what many 
officials in the Baltic countries say has been 
taking place consistently in the region for 
decades now since the Soviet Union 
disintegrated.31  
 
Russia is also guilty of relying on state-
backed media platforms and non-
governmental organizations to deliver skewed 
news and information to Russian speaking 
populations in the Baltic States.32 The Russian 
government’s “Compatriots Policy” functions 
as an arm of the state propaganda machine by 
linking pro-Russia organizations in the Baltics 
with necessary funding and resources.33  
 
Furthermore, Russian media outlets in the 
Baltics have become known for expressing 
anti-Western messages and tend to draw 
viewers in with higher production quality 
relative to local media outlets, which 
communicate in languages other than 
Russian.34 Estonia’s 2013 Internal Security 
Service Annual Report asserts that Russian 
influence operations in the country focus 
primarily on claims that, “Estonia supports 
Nazism; Russian-speaking people are 
discriminated against in Estonia en masse; 
[and] Estonia is a dead-end state that only 
causes problems for its Western partners.”35 
Latvia and Lithuania have also been targets of 
30 Reid Standish, “Russia’s Neighbors Respond to 
Putin’s ‘Hybrid War,’” Foreign Policy, October 12, 
2017. 
31 Andrew Radin, “Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: 
Threats and Potential Responses.” 
32 Ibid. 
33 Mike Winnerstig, Tools of Destabilization: Russian 
Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic 
States (Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2014). 
34 Andrew Radin, “Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: 
Threats and Potential Responses.” 
35 Estonia Internal Security Service Annual Review 
2017, Annual Reviews (Tallinn: Kaitsepolitseiamet, 
2017). 
 Connolly / Extended Deterrence 46 
 
 
claims that the government enforces “fascist” 
policies.36  
 
These examples represent elements of a larger 
influence campaign adapted to the 21st 
century information environment and geared 
towards fracturing ethnic populations in the 
Baltics while also cultivating general 
dissatisfaction with the state. 
 
To be clear, these instances alone do not offer 
concrete proof of an impending Russian 
offensive with real, kinetic effects. Because 
Russian aggression in the Baltics thus far has 
been non-violent and mostly non-attributable, 
it is evident that they remain wary of the 
potentially staggering consequences 
associated with a conventional war between 
themselves and NATO for the sake of three 
states whose people have already soundly 
rejected Kremlin rule twice in the past 
century. Somewhere there exists a threshold 
at which point Russia’s provocative actions 
will be met with retaliation. To operate 
beneath this threshold and to continue to 
apply non-kinetic tools with the hope of 
reigning Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia back 
into its personal sphere of influence is 
Russia’s goal. 
 
In order to understand this, much can be 
learned from the words of Russian leaders 
themselves. Mark Galeotti, a senior research 
fellow at the Institute of International Affairs 
Prague, famously published and analyzed a 
2013 speech by Russian General Valery 
Gerasimov.37 Galeotti coined the term 
“Gerasimov Doctrine” to refer to the speech 
which loosely outlined Moscow’s perspective 
on the rapidly-evolving security environment 
and the use of non-violent methods to achieve 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 
37 Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the 
‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’” Foreign Policy, March 5, 
2018. 
political and strategic goals in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring.  
 
Initial analysis of the speech focused on the 
idea that non-kinetic activities such as those 
seen in the Baltics are a prelude to war. In 
other words, these activities are the Kremlin’s 
way of “stirring up the battlefield” before 
really engaging in conflict. In a more recent 
analysis of the speech, however, Galeotti 
writes, “[t]he point is this: If the subversion is 
not the prelude to war, but the war itself, this 
changes our understanding of the threat…”38  
 
Galeotti argues that Russia does not equate 
the line between non-kinetic and kinetic 
activities with the line between peace and 
war. Rather, war exists on a wide spectrum 
and begins with non-violent, non-kinetic 
activities, which impact the adversary’s 
political, economic, and psychological 
condition. This analysis fits the narrative in 
the Baltic States quite well. 
 
Regardless of whether or not the conflict 
becomes violent, Russian non-violent 
aggression, as it stands today, poses a 
legitimate threat to stability in the Baltics and 
represents a serious challenge to the 
sovereignty of these states. An inadequate 
response from NATO gives weight to 
concerns that the alliance is not as resolute as 
it claims to be, and that the United States is 
not, in fact, a reliable partner in terms of 
security. For this reason, it is worthwhile to 
consider the signals that the United States is 
sending as well as the implications they have 










The annexation of Crimea and the 
onset of the Russian-backed separatist 
movement in Eastern Ukraine in the spring of 
2014 sent shockwaves across NATO. It had 
been over two decades since Western leaders 
had seriously considered the possibility of 
European states being violently attacked from 
the East. NATO was forced to re-discover its 
Cold War-era “playbook” and begin seriously 
thinking about Russia as an adversary once 
again. 
 
In June of 2014, just months after the onset of 
the conflict in Ukraine, US President Barack 
Obama introduced the European Reassurance 
Initiative.39 The President’s proposal, later 
approved by Congress, included $1 billion in 
support of coalition exercises with NATO 
allies, the deployment of US military 
advisors, and the improvement of critical 
security infrastructure in Europe. Each of 
these lines of effort put special emphasis on 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland given 
their history with and proximity to Russia.  
 
This policy was a clear and swift response to 
Russia’s decision to threaten peace on the 
continent. It was also a recognition of the fact 
that, since becoming bogged down in the 
Global War on Terror and naïve to the reality 
of great power competition, NATO’s force 
structure and capabilities in Europe had 
atrophied. 
 
The 2016 election of President Donald Trump 
gave many proponents of transatlantic 
collective defense cause for concern. As a 
                                                          
39 Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: 
European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts 
in Support of NATO Allies and Partners,” 
Whitehouse.gov. 
40 Jenna Johnson, “Trump on NATO: ‘I Said It Was 
Obsolete. It’s No Longer Obsolete.’,” The Washington 
Post, April 12, 2017, sec. Post Politics. 
candidate and president-elect, Trump openly 
called into question the efficacy of NATO and 
Article V several times.40 Once in office, 
however, Trump’s tone changed. In 2017, 
President Obama’s original policy was re-
named the European Deterrence Initiative and 
spending grew significantly to $3.4 billion 
annually.41  
 
Beyond that, the Trump administration’s 
National Security Strategy (2017) and 
Nuclear Posture Review (2018) were 
exceptionally candid in framing Russia as a 
legitimate, competitive adversary. Under the 
sub-heading “Promote American Resilience”, 
the most recent NSS asserts that, “actors such 
as Russia are using information tools in an 
attempt to undermine the legitimacy of 
democracies.”42 This accurately describes not 
just Russia’s efforts to interfere in American 
elections, but also the Kremlin’s hybrid 
strategy in locations such as the Baltics. Later, 
the document reads, “Russia seeks to restore 
its great power status and establish spheres of 
influence near its borders.”43 This is a direct 
reference to the annexation of Crimea and 
Russia’s greater expansionary ambitions in 
the former Soviet Union. These quotes reflect 
the Trump administration’s realist perspective 
on international affairs and a break from the 
Obama administration’s optimistic outlook on 
relations with Russia. 
 
With regards to the developments in the 
broader alliance, NATO heads of state and 
government gathered in Wales in September 
of 2014 with hopes of charting a new path 
forward in the face of a renewed, looming 
threat.44 Leaders agreed that the alliance 
41 Jen Judson, “Funding to Deter Russia Reaches $6.5B 
in FY19 Defense Budget Request,” Defense News. 
42 United States, “The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America” (President of the United 
States, December 2017). 
43 Ibid. 
44 NATO Heads of State and Government, “Wales 
Summit Declaration” (NATO, September 5, 2014). 
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needed to develop and implement an updated 
deterrence posture and took steps to begin 
restoring the foundations of collective defense 
in Europe. Among these steps was the pledge 
by each member to spend 2% of GDP on 
defense, as well as the establishment of the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 
(VJTF).45 The VJTF was to be brigade-sized 
and capable of responding to dynamic threats 
across the spectrum of warfighting domains.  
 
NATO leaders gathered once again in 
Warsaw in 2016 and laid out a series of 
decisions meant to strengthen deterrence. 
Chief among these decisions was the 
introduction of the Enhance Forward 
Presence. This initiative directed the 
development and deployment of four multi-
national, defensive battalions in Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively.46 
In Warsaw, the allies also nominally agreed to 
enhance resilience. NATO’s definition for 
resilience, however, was narrow in scope and 
strictly related to response after an armed 
attack.47  
 
Altogether, there is no question that the 
United States and NATO have made notable 
progress with regards to restoring 
conventional deterrence in Eastern Europe, 
specifically in the Baltics. These 
developments, however, have remained 
almost entirely tied to the military domain and 
do little to address the most pressing threats 
actually facing Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
Fighter jets, warships, and tanks ultimately 
cannot prevent the spread of propaganda or 
attacks in the cyber realm. 
 
                                                          
45 Guillaume Lasconjarias, Deterrence through 
Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of 
Being Prepared. 
46 NATO, “Warsaw Summit Key Decisions” (NATO 




Thinking along the lines of resiliency, NATO 
must look beyond strictly the military 
dimension and take a much broader approach 
to denying Russia its goals in the Baltics. 
There are a number of key areas in which the 
United States and allies ought to invest and 
turn their attention towards.  
 
For example, media outlets associated with 
the Russian state propaganda machine play a 
central role in the Kremlin’s influence 
strategy in the Baltics.48 Unfortunately, many 
TV channels, radio stations, and digital 
outlets with pro-European slants do not 
broadcast or publish their work in Russian. 
Those who are multi-lingual have access to a 
wide variety of news sources (English, 
Latvian/Lithuanian/Estonian, and Russian) 
and are able to see-through absurd Russian 
propaganda.49 However, members of society 
who, to begin with, are most vulnerable to 
Russian influence are left to consume media 
from pro-Kremlin sources, which also tend to 
have higher production quality, thus 
solidifying interest from viewers.50  
 
Essentially, there exist separate information 
spheres which are sharply divided by 
language. Working to ensure that Russian-
speaking people in the Baltics have access to 
free and fair media will make them less 
susceptible to Kremlin-generated talking 
points and decrease dissatisfaction with the 
state. 
 
48 Mike Winnerstig, Tools of Destabilization: Russian 
Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic 
States. 
49 “Disputing Putin: How the Baltic States Resist 
Russia,” The Economist, January 2019. 
50 Mike Winnerstig, Tools of Destabilization: Russian 
Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic 
States. 
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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a US 
government funded endeavor, has done work 
along these lines since the Cold War and 
claims to have, “played a significant role in 
the collapse of communism and the rise of 
democracies in post-communist Europe.”51 
RFE/RL discontinued services directed 
specifically for the Baltics in 2004. 
 
Along the same lines, ensuring the 
assimilation and enfranchisement of ethnic 
Russians and Russian-speaking people in the 
Baltics is also of great importance. This issue 
most directly pertains to Latvia, the Baltic 
state most heavily impacted by Russian 
immigration during the Soviet era. According 
to the European Network on Statelessness, 
roughly 230,000 people currently living in 
Latvia (about 12% of the total population) fall 
under the classification of “non-citizen”.52 
This is largely the result of harsh laws passed 
in the early 1990’s which prevented those 
who arrived in Latvia during Soviet times 
from becoming fully naturalized citizens. 
Non-citizens in Latvia are denied the 
opportunity to participate in formal political 
processes, cannot work in government, and do 
not have freedom of mobility within the 
European Union.53  
 
To make matters worse, the general use of 
Russian language in Latvia has also faced 
legal restrictions. A 2018 law approved by 
Latvia’s parliament and president severely 
limits the use of Russian language in schools 
across the country despite the fact that many 
students speak and understand little to no 
Latvian.54  
                                                          
51 A. Ross Johnson, “History of RFE/RL,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty. 
52 Jo Venkov, “European Network on Statelessness,” 
Not Just a Simple Twist of Fate: Statelessness in 
Lithuania and Latvia, October 2018. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Lucian Kim, “A New Law In Latvia Aims To 
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Both Lithuania and Estonia have taken more 
progressive approaches to ensuring that 
Russians living within their borders have 
opportunities equal to those of their ethnically 
native neighbors.55 Yet, in an effort to 
preserve its sovereignty and erase the legacy 
of Soviet occupation, Latvia effectively 
played into the hands of Kremlin-backed 
propagandists and provoked the birth of pro-
Russian political movements within its 
borders.56 In order to counter the impact of 
such movements, NATO allies ought to 
encourage Latvia to adopt policies similar to 
those of its neighbors to the north and south, 
which open the door for citizenship and 
tolerate the use of Russian language in official 
capacities. 
 
NATO has recognized the threat of cyber 
warfare and much progress has already been 
made with regards to cyber security in the 
Baltics. For example, upon request from 
Estonia in 2008 the alliance established the 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence. The size and scope of this entity’s 
responsibilities has grown over the course of 
the past decade, and it remains responsible for 
research and implementation of technology, 
operations, strategy, and law relating to the 
cyber domain.57 With the assistance of allies, 
the Baltics’ security apparatus to include 
military, law enforcement, and intelligence 
entities has become hardened against cyber-
attacks.  
 
However, one of the greatest remaining 
challenges with cyber security in the Baltics is 
the threat to private, non-governmental 
55 Jo Venkov, “European Network on Statelessness.” 
56 Andrew Higgins, “Populist Wave Hits Latvia, 
Lifting Pro-Russia Party in Election,” The New York 
Times (New York, October 7, 2018), sec. Europe. 
57 “About Us,” Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence. 
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entities. Since the end of the Cold War, many 
elements of national security and defense 
which were previously the responsibility of 
the state have been contracted out and turned 
over to the private sector. This is especially 
true with regards to transportation and 
communication networks, both of which are 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks.58  
 
Valuable organizations and networks which 
are not directly connected to national security 
or NATO are also subject to threats in the 
cyber realm. This includes media outlets, 
internet providers, cell networks, health care 
facilities, banks, and energy infrastructure 
among many other things. Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia each pride themselves on having 
fostered a unique culture of technological 
innovation and expansion.59  
 
As a result, nearly everything and everyone in 
this region is, in some way, connected and 
dependent upon the internet. Evidence shows 
that Russia clearly understands this 
dependency and has at least begun to explore 
methods to exploit weaknesses in the cyber 
domain in the Baltics’ private sector. In recent 
years, cyber operatives connected to Russia 
have infiltrated and impacted energy 
infrastructure, banking systems, and cell 
service networks in the Baltics.60  
 
Loss of access to any of these services could 
cripple the economy and shake citizens’ faith 
in the state. NATO, backed by the United 
States influence and resources, must expand 
the cooperative relationship between the 
public and private sectors with regards to 
cyber security. Moving forward, military, 
intelligence, and law enforcement 
organizations in the Baltics must work with 





Extended deterrence, as traditionally 
practiced by NATO, provides an outdated 
model for security in Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia. Today, the threat from Russia facing 
the newest and most vulnerable members of 
the alliance transcends the military domain 
and includes a wide array of subversive, non-
violent, and non-kinetic activities. Increasing 
the number of allied forces in the region and 
improving interoperability demonstrate a 
strong commitment to deterrence. However, 
the likelihood of a conventional, kinetic attack 
is low.  
 
The presence of soldiers and warplanes 
cannot prevent information warfare or cyber-
attacks before they take place. For this reason, 
NATO must begin strengthening resiliency in 
the Baltics. By improving the condition of 
Russian speaking people, combating 
propaganda, and strengthening cyber security 
in the private sector, the Baltics will be more 
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Book Review 
Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against 
Established Knowledge and Why It Matters (NY: Oxford University 




This review is dedicated to Lt Gen (ret.) Brent Scowcroft, twice National Security Advisor and one-time 
head of the Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy.  If he is looking down on our work 
today, we hope he liked this book, Death of Expertise, by a much admired Naval War College professor 




Naval War College professor Tom 
Nichols built upon his popular essay in the 
Atlantic to deliver a blunt warning.1  After a 
venomous election in 2016 that swept the 
incumbent party from power, American 
democracy was in for a rough go.  Sir 
Lawrence Freedman (Emeritus, King’s 
College, London) employed the term 
“polemic” to characterize Death of Expertise, 
and Nichols did take shots at certain 
celebrities professing bizarre, defiantly 
unscientific, nostrums for better health.  Yet, 
Nichols, the strategist and foreign policy 
expert, had a loftier aim and a deeper message 
in mind than disarming the army of nattering 
nabobs on American social media. 
 
Expertise is also a eulogy for a young and 
strong United States in geopolitical terms, for 
a period, a lifetime ago, when Americans 
from all walks attentively tuned the radio to 
absorb learned rhetoric of the Commander-in-
Chief and earnestly assume their civic 
obligations as ordinary citizens in time of 
world war.  Nichols’ framing of the problem 
is at once profoundly conservative and anti-
Trump, at least the popular Trumpism in 
2016-2017 that pilloried expert professionals 
                                                          
1 Damon Coletta is 2020-2021 Scowcroft Professor in 
the Dept. of Political Science, U.S. Air Force 
Academy, author of Courting Science: Securing the 
from doctors to diplomats, then ran them out 
on a rail from positions of influence on 
America’s future. 
 
For the long decline of American democracy, 
Nichols located the mortal wound in the 
decade of the 1970s.  Failed intervention in 
Southeast Asia and the frustrated civil rights 
movement at home culminated in violent 
protest, riots, and proliferation of crimes—
kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, and a 
White House scandal—splashed across 
national media.  America appeared to recover 
from the discord at first, claiming victory in 
the Cold War and achieving a long sail of 
peace and economic growth during the 1990s.  
Nichols explained, though, how new factors 
such as emergence of the Internet, customer-
oriented concessions in higher education, and 
fragmentation of the media into cult punditry 
accelerated internal bleeding, cementing then 
spreading as a cancer popular skepticism of 
professional expertise. 
 
If Nichols’ diagnosis is correct, the American 
experiment is in trouble.  Nichols’ anchoring 
chapter on “Death of Expertise and 
Democracy” pointed out that experts across 
Foundation for a Second American Century (Stanford, 
2016), and coeditor of this journal. 
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the professions are losing patience with the 
public and, for their part, regular citizens are 
in no mood to grant credentialed pontificators 
the benefit of the doubt.  With general 
breakdown of communications between the 
professions and society, Nichols wrote, “all 
things are possible,” including “the end of 
democracy,” either by foreign intrigue or 
policy paralysis of republican government.  
These were the very threats to the American 
experiment George Washington spotlighted as 
he bequeathed the presidency in his classic 
1796 Farewell Address. 
  
Nichols, though, offers a fresh twist on the 
Washington Post’s latest motto, “Democracy 
dies in darkness.”  For Nichols, the looming 
darkness is not what most Americans would 
fear at onset, say, sudden suppression by a 
man on horseback or a popular fascist 
crushing the minority’s capacity to see or 
seek.  Rather, the darkness is insidious.  There 
is too much light at first, too much access, so 
many choices that free citizens lose their way.  
Anyone can become informed.  Every 
citizen’s judgment counts as good as the next 
opinion—on health, justice, science, or public 
policy.   
 
In his telling, Nichols approached the 
nineteenth century aristocrat Alexis de 
Tocqeville’s Democracy in America.  
Freedom and democracy do not actually 
suffocate in pitch darkness.  They drown in 
blooming, buzzing confusion—restless 
citizens chasing every which way an unholy 
Grail of universal equality.  Such rigid 
uniformity in tackling the world’s problems 
precludes specialization and excellence in the 
professions, undermines a key principle of 
social cohesion, and dashes hopes for a great, 
diverse Union that can be a beacon of human 
liberty as John Winthrop’s City on a Hill. 
 
To this point, Nichols trod on familiar ground, 
but he also wanted to argue that this time is 
different.  If expertise can die only once, the 
American people have only one shot.  Once 
they kill philosophy by arresting its seers who 
profess truths just beyond the ken of ordinary 
folk, once they tear down talented specialists 
and lock them away from societal influence, 
there is no going back to science based policy.  
Once unmoored from expertise, the free polity 
cuts its engines, adrift forever. 
 
Here, Nichols may have exaggerated his 
indictment, with the result that the death of 
expertise appears a most urgent threat to 
democracy’s survival, but the obligation of 
experts to do something about it is practically 
set aside.  Sure, educated professionals must 
remain cognizant of limits of their discipline 
and graciously accept defeat when politicians 
or layperson clients decide to reject best 
advice.  Nichols reserved the real task, 
though, for citizens, who en masse must find 
the wherewithal to look up from their daily 
cares and restore national faith in scientific 
elements of liberal education—that this 
process will produce experts who want to do 
good and know what they are talking about. 
 
The great twentieth century (expert) political 
scientist Samuel Huntington thought 
differently, that is, in terms of cycles or what 
he called creedal passion periods.  The 
American Revolution and struggle to ratify 
the United States Constitution represented the 
first such period.  Every sixty years or so, a 
generation would rise to challenge established 
ways of the democratic Republic, in short, to 
tear down old expertise and construct new 
institutions to shoulder the nation closer 
toward its founding ideals.  American 
democracy, Huntington wrote, was a 
“disappointment only because it is also a 
hope.”  The latter half of the American cycle, 
the recovery or upswing, is absent from 
Nichols’ account, and this omission changes 
everything. 
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The American people are not killing expertise 
or the possibility of creative specialization in 
society.  In their freedom, they are alert—not 
confused—when creaking social structures no 
longer keep pace with demand for prosperity 
and greater justice under liberal democracy.  
Once the old towers have fallen, there will 
come a historic moment, a Bretton Woods 
convocation or a Sputnik imperative, when 
expertise attuned to contemporary challenges 
is called back to life in service to the national 
experiment.  The upshot of Huntington’s 
theory of the case, as opposed to Nichols’, is 
the public will probably follow their usual 
cycle.  It is the experts who need to be 
prepared to act well when their moment 
arrives. 
 
While both Nichols and Huntington would be 
cautious about predicting just where 
democracy is in a political cycle while 
relations with science are in flux, the 2016 
election surprised most experts.  Three years 
later, President Trump was impeached by the 
House and soon thereafter acquitted by the 
Senate on contradictory, partisan votes.  The 
tumult in Washington may turn out to be 
symptomatic, announcing an unusual dearth 
of trust in expertise or professional staffs that 
ought to bring warring factions together and 
set a wise course for the country.  The 
COVID-19 pandemic may have hit too soon 
in the cycle for expert professionals to slip 
into place and ferry elected politicians 
expeditiously through twin health and 
economic crises.   
 
Experts, nevertheless, are on the case, and 
there may yet be an opening with the 
American people to help political leaders, 
divided across federal branches and individual 
state governments, in record time implement 
science based policy tied to COVID vaccines.  
 
Closer to the substantive focus of this journal, 
year 2019 also saw the inauguration of the 
U.S. Space Force (USSF), a separate service 
under the department and civilian secretary of 
the Air Force.  The birth of USSF manifests a 
stunningly swift shift in political headwinds 
against its creation a few short years before.  
Many defense policy experts counseled 
against the move.  
 
Rather than the death of expertise, though, 
USSF coming into being presents an 
opportunity, albeit on a different plane from 
COVID—one of those moments at the 
upswing of Huntington’s passion periods for 
another epistemic community to apply its 
specialized knowledge in service to the 
greater good. 
 
Talented members of the professional classes, 
meanwhile, have no time to wait for a positive 
swing in the public mood.  They will come 
around, according to the existing pattern, the 
cyclical relationship between democracy and 
the professions.  Still, military officers and 
civilian defense experts have immediate 
social responsibility to help their political 
masters, representatives accountable to the 
people, lead public opinion toward workable 
solutions for the new Space Force as well as 
the current pandemic.   
 
Expertise is not dying.  Contemporary 
politicians merely sent its purveyors back to 
the woodshed to work a bit harder, to sharpen 
their skills and knowledge for success against 
novel national challenges.  Adapting and 
applying expertise within a democratic 
political context will soon be the sacred labor 
of educated elites on space, health, the 
environment, education, and the economy.   
 
Nichols’ recommendations in his book for 
today’s experts unfortunately languished at 
second-priority status.  The best professionals 
already recall, always remember, that they are 
the advisers not the deciders, the servants not 
 Coletta / Death of Expertise 54 
 
the masters, of democratic society and 
republican government.   
 
Today’s experts have multiple jobs to do.  
Politicians backed by the public are 
requesting help on a variety of national issues 
that cut across academic disciplines and tap a 
mix of professions.  These will not always see 
eye-to-eye on the way forward.  Informed 
voices will not always cohere.  Nevertheless, 
public clamor for genuine expertise is likely 
to mount, not die away, after the 2020 
election.   
 
Expert professionals will abandon their duty 
if they shrink from the kind of politicized 
popular criticism that so exasperated Nichols.  
If the current creedal passion period will soon 
end, as in past cycles, the professional 
response to enormous national challenges has 
to be sober recognition of false starts, clear 
explanations of lessons learned from hard-
won experience, and steady, confident 
management of accountable government in a 
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